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FOREWORD
The Fourth Combined Manufacturers' and Technologists' Conference was hosted jointly by
NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in
Williamsburg, Virginia on April 14-16, 1992. The meeting was co-chaired by Dr. Roland Bowles
of LaRC and Robert Passman of the FAA. Dan Vicroy of LaRC served as the Technical Program
Chairperson and Carol Lightner of the Bionetics Corporation was the Administrative Chairperson.
The purpose of the meeting was to transfer significant ongoing results of the NASA/FAA
joint Airborne Wind Shear Program to the technical industry and to pose problems of current
concern to the combined group. It also provided a forum for manufacturers to review forward-
look technology concepts and for technologists to gain an understanding of the problerns
encountered by the manufacturers during the development of airborne equipment and the FAA
certification requirements.
The present document has been compiled to record the essence of the technology updates
and discussions which followed each. Updates are represented here through the unedited
duplication of the vugraphs, which were generously provided by the respective speakers. When
time was available questions were raken form the floor; if time was not available questions were
requested in writing. The questions and answers are included at the end of each presentation. A
general question and answer session was conducted at the end of each day and is included at the
end of report along with closing remarks.
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NASA/LMSC Instrument Design & Fabrication
Questions and Answers
Q: Bob McMillan (Georgia Tech) - Unless it has been improved lately, the NOAA LIDAR has
had some problems maintaining alignment. Specifically, it is difficult to keep the receiver spot and
the local oscillator single mode pattern aligned on the detector. How are you going tobe able to
solve these problems considering that your LIDAR operates in a harsher environment?
A: Russell Targ (Lockheed) - It is a two part question, one part pertains to the laser that we
built with United Technology, the other p_ is the design of the iaser that we are building with
CTI now. The laser that we are presently operating on the NASA aircraft is a CO2 laser _at
resides in a monolithic aluminum shell. The Iaser itself has vet:y carefully designed miri'ors, and
low center of gravity. The mirror spacing and alignment of the laser cavity is actively measured
and compensated for. We are not troubled with problems 0f t_ermal drift because tl:le laser is
water cooled with avery carefully regulated chiller and any residual motion is takenout by the :
active frequency stabilization. The cavity is carefully controlled with regard to its expansion by
the chiller and the alignment of the inner phorometer doesn't change once this thing has come up
to equilibrium. This is a fair question, recognizing that we have a meter long aluminum block and
aluminum should basically be considered as butter if it is sitting out in the atmosphere. But the
ordinary commercially available chiller is able to maintain the temperature even in the harsh
environment of the cargo bay to within a quarter degree centigrade. Our experience is that even_
in that terrible environment where-the aii fem=_rature is varying over 20 de=_es-ceri:t_gr_e we T2
are able to maintain the system in alignment for the duration of a flight. The reason that we are__
having better success than the NOAA laser, which has done yeoman service for many_ye_h's, is 2:
that the mounts of the NOAA laser are basically lollipop kind of mounts, up on stands, using
commercial equipment. That laser is indeed maintained by several PhD's who have grown up and
lived with the laser. Where as, ours is designed specifically to have very stable operation.
Q: Kim Elmore (NCAR) - How matureis laser technology compared to the set it and forget it
state of radar technology? When will such a system be commercially available? How will this
system compare with radar system costs? How sensitive is such a system to the degradation from
bugs and dirt that would get on the window? How much power does it consume?
A: Russell Targ (Lockheed) - Well radar technology is 50 years old and laser technology is 30
years old. So, radar technology is more mature. On the other hand, there are things that a 30
year old can do that a 50 year old can't do as well. There are hundreds of thousands of lasers in
CD players and tens of thousands of lasers in supermarkets and thousands of laser range finders in
tanks, none of which get any maintenance at all. The supermarket checker does not have to touch
his laser scanner, the GI in the tank does not have to touch his laser range finder. So, a lot of
progress has been made in the optimechanical design of laser radar systems and laser systems are
in general. It took about a decade for people to realize how you build kinematic mounts and
apply them to lasers, how you provide frequency stabilization, and how you solve those kinds of
problems. I would say that with regard to many laser systems they have achieved the set it and
forget it technology. When will such a system be commercially available? I presume that such a
system pertains to an airborne laser radar for wind shear measurement. The system that I showed,
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which is a 200 pound, kilowatt consuming, CO2 system, is not intended as a commercial system
for the world airline fleet. I think that would not be a sensible application. We are developing
together with CTI a two micron system that would meet the same performance requirements as I
described earlier. That system will be certified we anticipate in 1995 and available for sale at that
time. How will this system compare with radar system costs? I of course have no idea what
radar systems cost. We have spoken to a number of airline executives and they have described
what they would consider as an acceptable price for a solid state laser system that can measure
wind shear as well as clear air turbulence. We are able to build a system and sell it for prices that
airlines consider acceptable. If you need more information there are two people here from
Lockheed Austin Division who will be happy to discuss it with you and take your order. How
sensitive is such a system to the degradation from bugs and dirt that would get on the window?
No doubt about it, you are going to have to wipe off the window just as you have to wipe off the
windshield. In our limited experience, flying now through three flights, the hard coated window
of our scanner is simply wiped off with a rag. It has not had any special attention and we have not
observed degradation of the performance. How much power does it consume? The answer is
about three hundred watts. That would be the commercial unit.
Q: Jim Evans (MIT) - How does one determine the dBZ for lasers, and make it equivalent to
radar dBZ as a function of rain intensity. Since the rain drops are much greater than the wave
length, dBZ is usually measured only for Rayleigh scattering?
A: Russell Targ (Lockheed) - It is all perfectly true. We don't measure dBZ for LIDAR. We
erroneously showed an intensity chart with dBZ which is simply left over from its previous
incarnation from a radar system. What we are plotting in the color bar on the right side, is dB of
the signal noise ratio received at our coherent receiver. The signal to noise ratio goes typically
from 50 dB for hard targets to zero dB where we can no longer use it. A proper scale should say
is zero to fifty dB and not dBZ at all. That is our error. LIDAR aren't measuring things in dBZ.
Q: Jim Evans (MIT) - What is the pulse spacing of your LIDAR? I don't understand how pulse
pair approaches can be used with lasers given the very high Doppler velocities and the long
distance between pulses.
A: Russell Targ (Lockheed) - The pulse spacing is ten milliseconds because of the hundred
hertz laser. I have almost nothing u_ful to .say about the algorithms behind the poly pulse pair
processor. I think that I know just enough to answer your question. The poly pulse pair
processor is really misnamed. It is not a processor looking at several pulses. What it does is look
at several lags and perform an autocorollation on each pulse, several times per pulse. Rather than
looking at it and simply doing an FFT on that pulse. It is not a pulse comparison technique, it
takes several looks at each pulse, does an autocorollation analysis and drives the answer that way.
So, we are not looking at one pulse after another.
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NASA/LMSC Coherent Lidar Airborne Shear Sensor:
System Capabilities and Flight Test Plans
Paul A. Robinson
Lockheed Engineering & Sciences Co., Hampton, Virginia
Overall Objectives of the Flight Tests
The primary objective of the NASA/LMSC I Coherent Li 'dar Airborne Shear Sensor
(CLASS) system flight tests is to evaluate the capability of an airborne coherent lidar
system to detect, measure, and predict hazardous wind shear ahead of the aircraft with a
view to warning flight crew of any impending dangers. On NASA's Boeing 737
Trans_rt Systems Research Vehicle, the CLASS system will be used to measure wind
velocity fields and, by incorporating such measurements with real-time aircraft state
parameters, identify regions of wind shear that may be detrimental to the aircraft's
performance. Assessment is to be made through actual wind shear encounters in flight.
Wind shear measurements made by the CLASS system will be compared to those made
by the aircraft's in situ wind shear detection system as well as by ground-based Terminal
Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR) and airborne Doppler radar. By examining the aircraft
performance loss (or gain) due to wind shear that the lidar predicts with that actually
experienced by the aircraft, the performance of the CLASS system as a predictive wind
shear detector will be as_ssed.
The CLASS System
The CLASS system is required to measure wind shear ahead of an aircraft and relate that
measurement to the effect on the aircraft's performance. In addition the system must be
INational Aeronautics and Space Administration/Lockheed Missiles and Space Co.
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able to combine these measurements with current aircraft state parameters to predict the
effect on aircraft performance.
The CLASS system comprises a CO 2 laser radiating with a pulse energy of 10 rnJ at a
wavelength of 10.6 I.tm and pulse length of 2 Its, and employing optical heterodyne
detection. The range resolution is 300 m, and the velocity error is required to be less than
1 m/s. The range can extend to 10 km (.depending on aerosol size and density conditions),
and the scan can be centered +90 ° about the aircraft nose with an azimuth sweep of up to
+50 °. Velocity estimation uses a poly-pulse pair algorithm (Reference 1). The system is
described in detail in Reference 2.
The capability to read data tapes recorded in flight and reproduce all events seen in flight
is available on a ground-based workstation. Reprocessing of the data in order to assess
alternate calculation algorithms is also possible.
Measurement Capabilities and Wind Shear Products
This section describes how the CLASS system uses wind velocities measured by the
coherent lidar, and produces a higher level wind shear detection product quantifying the
effect of the wind field on the aircraft's performance.
The high level measurements of interest made by the system are Doppler return
intensities and line-of-sight wind velocities. The relation between the wind shear and the
aircraft's performance is given by the F-factor, F, (Reference 3)
V = +
g Va
The first term is the time rate of change of the inertial wind vector along and in the
direction of the airspeed vector, and the second term is the ratio of the inertial vertical
wind speed to the airspeed. Forward looking wind shear detectors can measure the wind
field at some region ahead of an aircraft and calculate an F-factor as follows.
Doppler return frequencies are processed to provide velocities at 300 m intervals (Ar).
The processing of the return signals to yield velcx:ities is described in Reference 1. The
first term in the F-factor (the 'horizontal' term, Fh) may be approximated by differencing
wind velocities, v, along a lidar measurement radial. The value at the ith range bin is
given by
vi+2 -- Vi VG
Fhi "-
2Ar g
The differencing scheme arises from using an unweighted least-squares fit over three
range bins (Reference 4). If required the velocities may be weighted in order to reduce
the effect_ of_ spurious_ velocity returns_ Th¢comput;d Fhi is t_hatwhich the aircraft wouki _
experience if it flew along the measurement radial through the hazard at the aircraft's
ground speed (VG)at the time of measurement.
The second term in the F-factor is introduced by implementing a simple linear vertical
wind estimator (Reference 5), giving the total F-factor at the ith range bin as
(3 hi/ i/gh,Fi=Fhi l+2"_aVg +[Fhi 2VaVg
_ ._. ___ __ =2_-- : = =: :
As described in Reference 6, the actual threat to an aircraft is based on the average F over
approximately ! kilometer. Therefore the above F-factor is averaged over three range
bins (900 meters) giving Fi as ....
-- El-, + Fi + Fi+l
Fi =
3
It has been determined (Reference 6) that a value of Fi > 0.105 represents a threat to the
aircraft. The minimum criterion for a hazard region is at least one range bin radially with
F> 0.105, as well as another range bin on an adjacent radial contiguous with it, also
with F> 0.105(see Figure 1). NASA's flight tests require a representational display of
the hazard region on the aircraft's research cockpit navigational display. This system is
described in Reference 7 for data produced by the airborne radar system. A similar
technique will be used in 1992 for the CLASS system. For this purpose a box is
generated with its center at the centroid as the hazard region, and with dimensions
proportional to the spatial extent of the measured hazard region.
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Interpretation of the Wind Shear Products
The measurements and wind shear products described above will be assessed by several
means. By actually penetrating microburst wind shears the predicted location and
intensity of the shears may be compared directly with those measured by the aircraft's
in situ system, the latter being taken to be the measurement standard. This will allow an
appraisal of the CLASS measurement accuracy. The CLASS wind shear measurement
can also be corroborated by the independent ground-based wind shear measurement of
the Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR). The aircraft will also be operating an
enhanced airborne weather radar (Reference 7). A comparison between the CLASS
measurement and this radar's measurement will provide a comparison of the relative
merits of radar- and lidar-based forward-looking wind shear detection systems.
Results to Date and Future Goals
To date, flight tests have been carried out to evaluate the overall system performance
prior to making actual wind field measurements. The laser has been found to be stable
and reliable. The ability of the scanner to point and compensate for aircraft motion has
been tested and is currently being assessed. In addition, the performance of the signal
processor, computer, and data recording system is under evaluation.
Tests to be carried out include a velocity calibration. This will determine the system's
capability to account for the aircraft's motion in making wind velocity measurements.
CLASS performance in obscuring and non-obscuring atmospheric phenomena will also
be studied. Examples of obscuring phenomena are rain, fog, and cloud. Typical non-
obscuring phenomena are planetary boundary layer shear, gust fronts, and sea-breeze
fronts.
The capability of the system to detect and measure actual microburst wind shears will be
evaluated this summer (1992) when the TSRV aircraft will penetrate microburst wind
shears in Orlando, FL, and Denver, CO.
6_
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NASA/LMSC Coherent Lidar
Airborne Shear Sensor (CLASS):
Flight Test Evaluations
Paul A. Robin_Qo .......
Lockheed Engineering & Sciences Co.
FourthCombinedManufacturers'andTechnologists'Airborne
WindShearReviewMeeting
Williamsburg,Va. April14-16 1992
Objectives of Flight Tests
To evaluate the ability of airbome lidar
technology to detect and predict hazardous
wind shear ahead of an aircraft with a view
to warning flight crew of Impending dangers.
666
System Definition
To measure wind shear ahead of the aircraft and relate that
measurement to an effect on the aircraft's performance.
Measure wind shear hazard accurately at least 10 seconds
ahead of an aircraft.
. Combine those measurements with aircraft state parameters to
assess the effect of any wind shear on the aircraft.
In Flight Measurements
Return Intensities
Line of sight wind velocity
In F!icJht Products
F-factor
1 Km averaged F-factor (#-)
Hazard regions
Discrete alerts
667
Interpretation of Products
Location and intensity of regions of hazardous wind
shear.
Comparison withalrbOrne and: grOUnd-based-radar
systems.
:±:: : :: : : :: :::
Comparison with aircraft°s in situ detection system.
i
Wind Shear Hazard Realon Definition
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Horizontal:
Total:
Fll = Vi+2- v i'V8
2At g
F=Fn l+2vaVg)
w
Averaged: Fi =
F_._+ Fi + Fi+l
Curre.nt Status
Laser operation and stability.
Scanner stability and positioning accuracy.
Data system operation.
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Future Goals
1. Velocity calibration.
2. Investigation of lldar performance in obscuring
and non-obscuring weather phenomena.
3. Investigation and assessment of lidar
performance in hazardous wind shears.
6?o
NASA/LMSC Coherent LIDAR Airborne Shear Sensor:
System Capabilities and Flight Test Plans
Questions and Answers
Q: Pete Sinclair (Colorado State University) - In calculating the F-factor what errors
magnitude do you expect from the technique used to estimate the vertical velocity term?
A: Paul Robinson (Lockheed) - The errors that were studied by Dan Vicroy and presented
earlier today where from 0 to 600 meters above ground. The estimation is plus or minus 2.5
meters per second.
Dan Vicroy (NASA Langley) - The results that I presented earlier from the In Situ data showed
about 2.5 to 3 meters per second RMS error in computing the vertical winds. We think we can
probably do much better than that once we get into some signal processing with the radar data.
We will be able to give you a more definitive number after we do the simulation with the
asymmetric microburst models. We will have that answer in about two or three months. From
our preliminary work, it looks like we can probably do at least 2.5 meters per second.
671
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Session VII. Airborne LIDAR Technology
Solid-State Coherent Lair Radar Wind Shear Measuring Systems
R. Milton Huffaker, Coherent Technologies
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COHEREIVT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
I ,\
- J P.O. Box 7488 Houldor, CO 80306 (303) 449.8736 FAX; 003) 449-8780
Fourth Combined Manufacturers' and Technologists'
=
=
Airborne Wind Shear Review Meeting
April 14 - 16, i992
SOLID-STATE COHERENT LASER RADAR
WIND SHEAR MEASURING SYSTEMS
R. Milton Huffaker
Coherent Technologies, Inc.
P.O. Box 7488
Boulder, CO 80301 USA
(303) 449-8736
i | ii
CONCEPTS 674 THEORY M( )Dt lING I)t SIGN SYSTEMS APPLICATIONS
I_l "_* ' "m_
co.ERE .NOLOG ES,INC.
• FAX 1303] 449.8780 _ P.O. Box 7488 Boulder, CO 80306 _ {303] 449.8736
Coherent Technologies, Inc. was established in 1984 to :
engage in the development of coherent laser radar systems
and subsystems with applications in atmospheric remote
sensing, and in target tracking, ranging and imaging. CTI
focuses its capabilities in three major areas:
Theoretical performance and design of coherent
laser radar systems
Development of coherent laser radar systems for
government agencies such as DoD and NASA
Development of coherent laser radar systems for
commercial markets ....
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Pulse Energy vs. Time Between Pulses
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CONCLUSIONS
• A RELIABLE GROUND-BASED 2 l_m COHERENT LIDAR HAS
BEEN DEMONSTRATED
DIODE-PUMPED 2 l_m LASERS AT POWER LEVELS >
AND PULSE ENERGIES OF > 100 mJ HAVE
DEMONSTRATED
lOW
BEEN
• THE POTENTIAL FOR COMPACT EYESAFE ALL-SOLID-
STATE COHERENT LASER RADAR SYSTEMS HAS BEEN
DEMONSTRATED USING DIODE PUMPING (Complete
transceiver @ 1-2 W avg. power requires " 1 ft3)
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Solid-State Coherent Laser Radar Wind Shear Measuring Systems
Questions and Answers
Q: Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - Is the material damage problem solved with solid state
two micron technology? Particularly if you pump it reasonably hard, like five or ten millijoules?
A: Milt Huffaker (Coherent Technologies) - I think it is. We have researched those materials
and had special materials developed, and those materials have proven themselves as damage free.
Q: Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - So that problem is behind us?
A: Milt Huffaker (Coherent Technologies) - Right.
Q: Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - What about the availability of diodes that would put us
up around the fifty to one hundred millijule capability?
A: Milt Huffaker (Coherent Technologies) - Well the diodes are there, the question fight now
is the cost.
Phil Brockman (NASA Langley) - We have 64 diode arrays, at 300 watts each, on order fight
now for Langley. They cost us $300,000 dollars when we ordered them.
Q: Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - Is Sony making these?
A: Milt Huffaker (Coherent Technologies) - Spectra Diode Labs is the main developer here in
this country. We have been using 3 watt diodes and they are working on 10 watt diodes. The
technology is changing and every six months it will be cheaper.
Q: Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - But when does it stabilize to the point we can think
about practical two micron airborne systems?
A: Milt Huffaker (Coherent Technologies) - As I mentioned, we have demonstrated in the lab
an all diode pumped transmitter, to the energy and power we are talking about.
Q: Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - So we are ready to do a point design on an airborne
instrument and go.
A: Milt Huffaker (Coherent Technologies) - I think we are now ready to implement that, in my
opinion.
+ .2
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Session VIII. Passive Infrared Technology N93-14849
Development of the Advance Warning Airborne System (AWAS)
Pat Adamson, Turbulence Prediction Systems
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ABSTRACT
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ADVANCE WARNING AIRBORNE SYSTEM (AWAS)
H. PATRICK ADAMSON
TURBULENCE PREDICTION SYSTEMS
BOULDER, COLORADO 80301
The thermal characteristics of microbursts are utilized by the
AWAS IR and OAT features to provide predictive warning of
hazardous microbursts ahead of the-_aircraft during landing or
take off. The AWAS was evaluated satisfactorily in 1990 on a
Cessna Citation that was intentionally flown into a number of
wind shear events. The events were detected, and both the IR and
OAT thermal features were shown to be effective. In 1991, AWAS
units were flown on three American Airlines MD-80s and three
Northwest Airlines DC-9s to study and to decrease the nuisance
alert response of the system. The_AWAS was also flown on the
NASA B737 during the summer of 1991. The results of these
flights were inconclusive and disappointing. The results were
not as promising as before because NASA conducted research
flights which were outside of the normal operating envelope for
which the AWAS is designed to operate. In an attempt to
compensate for these differences in airspeed and mounting
location, the automatic features of the system were sometimes
overridden by NASA personnel during the flight. Each of these
critical factors is discussed in detail. The effect of rain on
the OAT signals is present_ed as a function of the air speed. Use
of a 4 pole 1/20 Hertz filter is demonstrated for both the IR and
thermal data. Participation in the NASA 1992 program was
discussed. FAA direction in the continuing Certification program
requires the addition of a reactive feature to the AWAS
predictive system. This combined system will not require flight
guidance on newer aircraft. The features of AWAS-IV, with the
NASA algorithm included, were presented. Expected completion of
the FAA Certification plan was also described.
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Over the past five years, Turbulence Prediction Systems (TPS), in Boulder,
Colorado has combined the concepts of the thermal properties of microbursts
with the behavior of infrared OR) in the atmosphere, and OAT (Outside Air
Temperature) response on the aircraft flying into such events. From these
studies, TPS has established an Advance Warning Airborne System (AWAS)
that has proceeded through its third version, AWAS-III, and is in process of
FAA certification.
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During the summer of 1990, AWAS-III was flown on the Cessna Citation
research aircraft operated by the University of North Dakota (UND) in
conjunction with the FAA study of the MIT Terminal Doppler Weather Radar
(TDWR) in the detection of microbursts. This provided unique opportunity
for AWAS-III to predict and enter a number of wet microbursts in Orlando,
Florida, and several dry microbursts in Denver, Colorado.
693
AWAS-I_, With software version 2.0, was installed in the Citation in June of
1990. It was located in the luggage compartment in front of the pilot, and
the IR from ahead Of the aircraft Was reflected into A'_AS-III via a 2" gold
coated mirror mounted outside, just below the windshield, where it did not
interfere with the pilot's view. Sixty-six flights were flown in attempts to
make wind shear contacts.
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The received IR power is separated into appropriate wavelengths by a
spectrometer.
IR detectors.
The IR power in these wavelengths is then registered by two
z.--c
AWAS processes the difference between far and near IR
indicated temperatures to generate a "Predictive Hazard Index" that relates to
the microburst's hazard. Airspeed, pitch, radio and pressure altitudes are
also used. The OAT data is also used to create a "Thermal Hazard l_dex"-_
relating to microbursts.
r
For research purposes, 47 AWAS in flight and
aircraft data parameters are recorded.
post-flight analyses_
These parameters were used for the
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One of the most important microburst penetrations was on July 7th, 1990.
The aircraft airspeed during approach was 180 knots, and the aircraft entered
the center of the microburst. The IR created a warning at 55, and 35 seconds
before that which would have been provided using a hazard index calculated
from the winds recorded by the inertial system, i.e,, inertial warning. The
r
Thermal Hazard Index provided a warning 15 seconds before the inertial
warning. The TDWR measured the event a few sbconds before the aircraft
entered the microburst. The hazard value calculated by the TDWR was
0.155, inertial hazard index was 0.17, and the AWAS IR hazard index was
0.15. This data was presented at the 3rd Combined NASA meeting in
January 1991.
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Another important aspect of the certification program was to determine the
level of nuisance alerts which might occur in revenue service. American Air
Lines cooperated with TPS in this phase of the program. An AWAS-III with
a recorder was installed, starting in February of 199i, on 3 MD-80 aircraft.
Many thousand flights have been conducted with these units on board.
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AWAS was installed in the front wheel-well of the MD-80. The mirror,
• _ wfi_Cfi is seen lower right in the picture, has the red alignment laserbeam
centered on it. The laser is used in the installation to guarantee that AWAS
loo_s%u_tlie flight line of the aircraft. -_::-_ : i __ ;
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The AWAS Uses 28 VDC and _tti¢ mirror is also hcated_with 28 VDC. The
AWAS receives the necessary aircraft data via ARINC. This aircraft data
and the AWAS generated data is transmitted to the recorder. A lap-top
computer was used as the recorder.
704
rr"
(D
C)
a..
(/)
r_
(/)
T===
CO
C_
T===
!
T===
r---O')
_O
O
C'q
_===
_===
, b--
Z
v---ILl
O')(/)
C) w
_===
_===
705
=From an analysis of the early data the software version was changed in
October, 1991. Over a thousand flights have been recorded since these minor
software changes were installed ....
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A second commercial airlines program involved the installation of AWAS-III
with a Honeywell Windshear Computer on three DC9 aircraft. Northwest
Air Lines installed these units from June to December of 1991.
This installation was also in the front wheel well, on the port side, but at a
somewhat higher lcvci.
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In this program, both an AWAS and a Honeywell WindShear Computer
(WSC) were installed. The AWAS received three inputs from analog
connections with the aircraft instruments, and five from ARINC through the
WSC. These 8 input items plus 17 AWAS generated i_tem_sWere passed
through the WSC to the recorder.
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The AWAS'III -_--_;>_ _ _ _.....
software was updated twice in this _rogram. Th_major
changes were to prevent AWAS nuisance response to non-hazardous weather
conditions.
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NWA3.2 represents the latest software upgrade. These changes _vere to
rcduce nuisance from invcrsions, and to incorporate improved pitch
correction equations.
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The operationof the AWAS has been exceptionally free of failure over more
than 2 years. The iR window and the gold coated, heated mirror have been
inspected regularly. While the mirrors have not required aiiy replacement,
the windows have becn cleaned every 4 to 6 weeks--to eliminate these
cleanings, a protective coating has been applied to one window on American
Air Lines, andto all 3 windows on Northwest Air Lines. The coating, while
2:--
still under study, appears to solve the problem of window degradation.
Because both of the airlines testing thesc AWAS units have flights through a
wide variety o_fweather conditions, it is bclieved that these tests are effective
for establishing response to a large environmental envelope.
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While passive IR power may bc diminished somewhat in rain, this has not
appeared to be a problem during any commercial test flight. Heating the
mirror within a pre-set range of temperatures is important for the proper
function of the AWAS, and to prevent icing. :_
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In the summer of 1991, NASA includcd A_S-III in its tests of radar in
penetrations of microbursts. The AWAS unit operated in these flights used a
softwarc configuration comparable to thc c:lrly vcrsion used in the American
Air Lines flights. _
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Normal Flight Mode:
The AWAS is programmed to operate in a normal flight pattern and not
in a research mode. Consequently, the AWAS changes from one mode to
another automatically as the aircraft takes off, cruises and then enters the
landing phase of flight. During these phases the AWAS collects and stores
data necessary for different phases of the flight. If the AWAS is rebooted
(restarted), or if the modes are changed by means other than that
automatically prescribed by the internal software of the AWAS, valuable data
necessary for the proper functioning of the AWAS may be lost, or not be
collectable again in time to provide an adequate warning. In normal flight, if
the system is rebooted, the failure light is illuminated until the AWAS is
again operating properly.
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Research Flight Mode:
It was discovered that NASA, in an effort to assure accurate data for
research purposes, overrode the automatic mode functions of the AWAS.
Unfortunately, if this switching occurred shortly before an encounter with a
microburst, all of the data banks would be zeroed, with the result that some
of the information, e.g., lapse rate, required for the AWAS to operate
properly would be lost. To date, NASA has been unable to provide TPS
with the time of occurrence when the five manual overrides occurred. If this
information becomes available, it may be possible to determine what effect, if
any, these overrides would have had on the performance of the AWAS.
In conclusion, the 1991 test flights of the AWAS by NASA were not as
successful as anticipated because the AWAS was flown in an inappropriate
flight envelope.
728
The factors, either individually or combined, that contributed to this poor
performance were:
1. The ability of NASA to ovcrridc on command the AWAS
automatic mode selection routine;
2. The undesirable location and method of mounting the mirror and the
-i_nfrared window assembly; .............. -_
3. Airspeed in excess of that which is encountered in normal landings
and take offs.
The first of these, mode selection, has bccn discussed, and the problems
with the periscope location and design, and airspeed factors, will now be
discussed.
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kThe effect on the performance of the AWAS duc to the location and method of
mounting of the mirror and window assembly became very apparent during the
NASA 1991 summer flights. While there had been no impairment of the infrared
line of sight in the earlier installations on the UND Citation II, American Airlines
MD-80's, or Northwest Airlines DC9"s, it became apparent when TPS analyzed the
flight data received from NASA that the look distance of the AWAS was often
seriously impaired.
The exact cause of this impairment has not yet been determined. In some cases
it appears that it may be due to rain collecting in the periscope. Yet, in o_ther cases
_!: _ .
where rain existed, the look distance did not appear to be affected. It was
determined in the very earliest flights that extensive damage was occurring to the
mirror. The damage over the summer was sufficient to require that the mirror be
replaced twice. No sigLlificant damage has occurred on any of theother
installations. This includes over 10,000 hours of flight in revenue service.
The effect of reduced look distance will, of course, reduce the ability of the
AWAS to sense the microburst within an adequate time, and/or to measure the
intensity of the event accurately.
Consequently, the impairment of the look distance during these summer 1991
flights certainly contributed to the apparent poor performance of the AWAS.
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The aircraft airspeed has, as is indicated in the previous graph, a
significant effect on the amount of warning time provided. This relationship
is quite apparent when it is noted that the AWAS will sense the event from a
given distance, but that distance will be traversed by the aircraft in less time
due to the greater airspeed. Because of safety reasons, the NASA B 737 flew
at airspeeds from 230 to 260 knots rather than the 130 to 160 knots flown in
normal revenue service by jet aircraft. The airspeed factor was not as
significant when the UND Citation II encountered microbursts during the
summer of 1990 because the Citation was able to approach and penetrate the
events at a much slower airspeed, e.g., 160 to 190 knots.
The distribution of landing speeds from 972 flights is depicted in the
following graph.
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The AWAS-III was designed to estimate the hazard or F factor for use
with aircraft operating at a normal landing, or take off speed of
approximately 140 knots. For example, the MD-80's data shown in the
previous graph indicates a central value of about 140 knots with a maximum
value of 171 knots. The F factor as incasurcd a_:approach speeds of up to
260 knots in the NASA research flights are not comparable with the F factor
computed at the lower normal airspeeds. The effect of these differences earl
be understood by an analysis of the following equations.
The hazard index, F, is based upon the vertical and horizontal winds.
These F factors can be appreciated more completely relative to the airspeeds
if we look at the nature of the equations and the measurements.
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DEFINITION OF
PAGE
TASS F MODEL
1
USING THE TASS DATABASE AS INPUT:
Fw_ _ = F a + F w
WHERE f =
du
dt
G
WHERE d t = 1 second
WHERE F w = - w/ AIRSPEED
FWIND = (
du
dt
G
) + (-w/AIRSPEED)
• du
if--_. >O then u = tailwind / deczeasing headwind -w is a downdzaft
dr
735
The TASS F model represents a hazard index that is separated into two
terms, one related to the acceleration of horizontal winds, and the other
rela(ed to the velocity of Veriicai winds_ _The ficce[eraiion_ofthe horizontai _ _
winds are shown as a time derivative of the horizontal wind velocity. This is
divided by G, which is the acceleration of gravity. This provides a first term
which is independent of the dimensions. The second term contains the
vertical wind velocity divided by the airspeed. This again provides a term
that is dimensionless. It is important to apply the directional senses shown,
in order for the F values to be of the signs anticipated. An important aspect
of the TASS database used in conjunction with these equations is the
continuity of time, t. This does not mean that data is present for all possible
time values. It means that the data is gcneratcd from equations that could
provide meaningful wind wdues at all possible time values, without
"exploding" anywhere between time values. Values for study are provided
by the instrumentation only once each second. Thus, dt is one second.
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DEFINITION OF TASS
PAGE 2
F MODEL
USING THE TASS DATABASE AS INPUT:
t IS CONTINUOUS FOR THE FOLLOWING EQUATIONS
10 0 0 METERS
WHERE S_NTECE R = A _PEEDM/-._O s
1 KMFTwIND =
S INTEGER
FWXN D
S INTEGER
TASS IS THE TERMINAl, ARHA SlMIII,ATION ._Y.gTEM WET MTCROBURST STUDY
NASA W]NDSHEAR MODEl, (PROCTOR 1987 )
caJ|ed nasaiv.dat
_7
7In order to obtain an average value of F over a kilometer of flight, we
first establish the number of seconds (S) required to proceed 1000 meters.
Because the data comes only each second, we choose the closest integer value
for S. The lower equation shows the use of this integer, S, and the F values
obtained at each second from 1 to S. This provides us with the average F
value over that 1 km distance.
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Peak F Index versus Altitude at Different Airspeeds:
As can be observed from this graph, the computed peak F factor is not a
constant in relationship to either altitude or airspeed. These calculations are from a
NASA microburst model. The effect of airspeed on the F calculation can be seen
as separate curves for 140 and 240 knots. The F values for these two airspeeds are
the same only at one altitude, e.i., 350 meters AGL. At altitudes below 350 meters
the two airspeeds have changes in F values that are reverse to the anticipated
Z
dangers. That is, the higher airspeed has the larger F value, implying the greater
danger to the aircraft. The aircraft is actually in greater danger at 140 knots,
however, for it cannot counter the tailwind and climb against the downdraft as
effectively at this lower airspeed. Thus, the F index values computed hereare in
error relative to the aircraft situation.
It is apparent from the data presented in the graph that the calculation of the F
factor over a wide range of airspeeds may not provide values that are consistent
with the danger to the aircraft, especially at altitudes of below approximately 350
meters AGL. This should be considered a notable limitation on using the F factor
outside the normal flight envelope, i.e., landing and take off at airspeeds above
about 160 knots.
74O
Thus, the importance of this graph is to show that the magnitude of the F
peak value will be a significant function of the altitude of approach and the
airspeed.
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When using the AWAS-III algorithm which takes advantage of thermal
measurements, we obtain a rather different situation. Here, the lower the
airspeed, the greater the peak value of the AWAS F index. This seems quite
reasonable, for the lower the airspeed, the greater the danger-to the aircraft.
When the aircraf(is flying fast enough, the danger is sufficiently low that a
warning is not required. Also, we see that the lower the airspeed, the earlier
the warning will be given. This also seems quite appropriate. Thus, we see
that there is a very fundamental difference between the NASA F index, and
the AWAS F index in character. These differences make it very difficult to
directly compare the NASA and the TPS warning systems on a truly
meaningful basis.
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The additional concern related to the airspeed is that of the response of
the OAT transducer when operating in the presence of rain. The airspeed
effect on the output of the OAT is related to the presence of rain which can
evaporate and provide cooling for the gauge. The amount of cooling is a
direct function of the airspeed. There is very often rain associated with the
microbursts, thus there can be quite different response to these events with
different airspeeds. It is possible at these considerably higher than normal
landing and take off speeds to obtain temperature indications that can cause
nuisance alarms when there are no microbursts present. Here we see that
between 2 and 3 degrees Celsius temperature change can occur due to the
difference in airspeed from 140 to 240 knots when flying into one inch per
hour of rain. As a result, the higher airspeed can cause a warning to be
given even when there is no actual change in air temperature. This is of
considerable concern, for it keeps the OAT indicated temperature from being
an accurate sensor of windshear when the airspeed is significantly greater
than 140 knots. The problem of evaporate cooling has not presented a
serious problem on other flights at normal landing speeds.
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During the NASA penetration (B143), the IR sensor was not significantly
blocked, and the IR performed as expected, when the data was adjusted for
airspeed. After the data was adjusted to 140 knots, good agreement was
provided among AWAS, the TDWR, and the NASA algorithm using inertial
(wind) data. Noise level in the NASA algorithm is plus or minus 0.02.
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Several post-flight tests were performed by computer on the data from this
NASA test run. One was the use of a 4 pole 1/20 Hz filter on the raw data
before entering it in the TPS algorithm. In addition, the NASA algorithm
output was adjusted to 140 knots, even though the actual airspeed was about
235 knots average. This data is shown for the AWAS IR detector that looks
up (LU) from the aircraft waterline by approximately 3 degrees. The
predictive F indication from AWAS was considerably lower in magnitude
than the inertial NASA F indication, which could be a result of the window
still not being very clear. However, since the IR sensed the event about 34
seconds ahead of the inertial response, it appears that the IR was able to
perform from a considerable distance in this case.
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An identical treatment was given to the AWAS IR detector that was looking
up from the waterline by only about I degree (LF). In this case the AWAS
provided an F value of almost O. 12, and the airspeed corrected NASA
algorithm provided a little over O. 15 for its F factor. The peak provided by
the AWAS system precedcd the NASA peak by about 34 seconds.
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The OAT based AWAS signal was also run through the 4 pole 1/20 Hz filter.
This provided an F value of 0.18, and proceeded the NASA algorithm to the
trigger point of 0.15 by 48 seconds. This F value for the thermal system was
larger than anticipated, and responded sooner than would normally have been
anticipated. Both of these effects could well have resulted from high airspeed
through rain on the approach to the event. The smaller AWAS IR F values
than the NASA values were in goodagreement with the TDWR
measurements.
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The TDWR reflectivity data indicate 2 miles of flight in 1"/hour rain prior to
contact with the event. This could account for the OAT response that was
very early and large at this 235 knot airspeed. This would provide a signal
that was about 26 seconds early.
-: • .
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If the AWAS is flown in the 1992 summer NASA B737 test program, the
AWAS software will be upgraded to that presently being flown by Northwest
Air Lines.
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There are a number of technical, as well as Ilight profile issues that must be
resolved before further test flights into microbursts for the purpose of
evaluating the AWAS in comparison with the NASA systems can be
conducted. These are:
1. Change in the mirror/window installation.
2. Adjustment of airspeed effects in excess of the normal
landing and take off airspeeds.
3. Overriding the AWAS automatic modes by NASA personnel.
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The most recent FAA direction with respect to certification of AWAS is the
development of AWAS-IV. This would combine t__present predictive Ill
and OAT features with a reactive inertial system utilizing the NASA
algorithm. The new combined system will provide prediction with the 100%
detection (not protection) that is presently required.
762
fW
m
F--
r.p
W
rY
I
i--
m
W
w
i-
ra
r_
W
r_
u
{t")
__1
I--
rY
W
Z
0
n,,
0
E_
fY
0
_J
= O0 <I:
O0
rJ
1
t
I
t
r..pL
_d
"_ 0
n,- 0
W __1
I--
0
r_
_.1
ry
__1
0
0
__1
GO
n
I---
W
_.1
__1
0
n,"
F-
13_
0
O_
763
The block diagram for AWAS-IV shows the added inertial data input to the
NASA algorithm for LLWS. It also shows the IR sensor input at altitudes of:
15,000 feet, and above, being used for the prediction of CAT (Clear Air
Turbulence) events. The cockpit interface provides for aural warnings and
lamps. The lamps would provide LLWS and CAT warnings. In addition,
there would be a lamp to warn of inoperation of the AWAS system. It is
critical for safety purposes that the pilot know if the AWAS is not operating.
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Another aspect of the communication with the pilot is the providing of
"cautions" when there is high probability of danger due to atmospheric
conditions, but no specific event has bccn detected.
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The predictive certification will use flight data from the UND and NASA
flights to determine the ability of the AWAS to predict events. The flight
data from American and Northwest Air Lines flights will be used to
determine the level of nuisance alerts.
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Development of the Advance Warning Airborne System (AWAS)
Questions and Answers
Q: Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - You talked about designing to a 140 knot target
airspeed. That means you have a design methodology because in fact you designed it for 140.
Why can't we repeat that methodology and design it for 2107
A: Pat Adamson (Turbulence Prediction Systems) - I think it could be done. I don't think it
could be done in time for this deployment. I also have a problem with spending a lot of energy
designing something that we are not intended to use. Airplanes don't operate in that regime.
Q: Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - We are showing on charts that we are taking data
measured under one set of conditions and as you point out scaling it back to another. So it seems
to me that you must have your own scaling relationship. I think it would be important to this
audience for you to di._uss what you think is the technical basis for relating an IR measurement to
an airp!ane energy change?
A: Pat Adamson (Turbulence Prediction Systems) - I think it comes down to the forcing
function of the event. A downdraft is cold air falling. If you look at the accident/incident data
you see a sustained temperature drop over about thirty seconds as the aircraft penetrates the
encounter. Now we don't u_ the actual aircraft temperature data, but we use the temperature
gradient data as the forcing function for our algorithm. That is really the basis for it.
Q: John llansman (MIT) - ! was a little confused by your nuisance alert chart. On the
American Airlines data, was that 20% of all the flight hours or flights you received some sort of
nuisance alert?
A: Pat Adamson (Turbulence Prediction Systems) - That is correct.
John Hansman (MIT) - I am a little concerned from a display and human factors standpoint. If
you have nuisance alerts at any significant level and you alert with a simple light in the cockpit,
then you are going to run into fidelity or trust problems with the crew. Do you want to comment
on that?
Pat Adamson (Turbulence Prediction Systems) - I totally agree with you. I think that it is an
unacceptable alerting ratio. We decided to get at least 3,000 flights in our database before we
made any significant software revision. So that we could look at the data. Right now on 3-2 we
have one alert in 135 flights. We do not anticipate an alert any more often than the recommended
nuisance alerting in the reactive systems. We have to get down to nuisance alerts of less than one
per 2,500 flights or .so, and that is where we think we are going.
Q: Jim Evans (MIT) - ! low do you discriminate between gust fronts, which are going to
produce a gain in energy state, versus microbursts? They both have pools of cool air.
A: Pat Adamson (Turbulence Prediction Systems) - What we are looking at is a temperature
gradient and a specific signature. I guess that is the best answer that I can give you.
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Q: Jim Evans (MIT) - Have you attempted to fly through a lot of gust fronts and demons_ate
that you are not generating an incorrect alert or do you view it as a correct alert?
A: Pat Adamson (Turbulence Prediction Systems) - I guess if the shear is high enough, even if
it is a negative shear, I would be considering it a dangerous event.
Jim Evans (MIT) - When you goSnto a gust front:you: us_afiyget a headwind +increase but you
do not have a tailwind, so you actually have an increase in energy state. It maybe a controllability
issue, or a long landing, but it is not like the plane is going to get smashed out of the sky.
Pat Adams0n_ur-b:tilence+Predict-i-0n Sysl[ems}-- That's true. :_king at the work that
Marilyn Wolfson did in your organization, her concern was that the dangerous events were
associated with pre-existing gust fronts or thunderstorm outflows. Several of the gust front data
show very high turbulence or vorticity associated with them. As it is right now, what we are
trying to do is to use the temperature gradient and the signature to discriminate between severe
events and non-severe events.
+ _
Q: Gerry Aubrey (United Airlines) - Do you have a threshold for what is the significant clear
air turbulence you want to indicate?
A: Pat Adamson (Turbulence Prediction Systems) - We are working on that. The data that
we are using for indication of severity is the vertical acceleration of the aircraft. We have been
using 0.2 G or greater. But, the airlines do not seem to be interested in this small of a threat.
They are much more interested in the larger one. We do not have much data where there is a
severe event, even in some 5,(XX) flights.
Q: Kim EImore (NCAR) - ! would like to follow up on something that Jim Evans was talking
about, and that is di_rimination between a gust front event and a microburst event. Specifically
in the Denver area, because that is where I have most of my experience, we find that the gust
fronts tend to be colder events generally than the microburst. As I understand it, that would set
off even a louder bell?
A: Pat Adamson (Turbulence Prediction Systems) - It depends, we look at not only the
temperature drop but the signature that as we would encounter that event at 140 knots. If the
temperature gradient is too high or too short in time it would discriminate against it.
Q: Kim Elmore (NCAR) - O.K..so if it is too high or too short or too big a gradient then you
tend to throw that out?
A: Pat Adamson (Turbulence Prediction Systems) - That is correct.
Q: Pete Sinclair (Colorado State University) - I think the answer to that question is going to
end up in the scanning procedure that will come out later on. We will be able to scan across the
gust front and see quite a different configuration than a small microburst. My question is how do
you keep the system clean and abrasion free? How do you keep it clean without a sealed system
where the mirror and the whole system is internally sealed?
778
A: Pat Adamson (Turbulence Prediction Systems) - Actually, that has been sort of a
revelation. When we fh'st put this on we were worried about that. The minor is heated. It has
120 watts of heat, with heavy gold plate on it, and the window is flush against the skin. The
natural cleansing action of the rain and the warm mirror seems to be very effective. On American
Airlines we have a coated window, we went to material that was supplied to us by Ball Brothers
Aerospace and we now have five months on that installation without having to clean it or touch it.
So, the natural cleaning action and the rain with the warm mirror seems to be very effective. We
have been very surprised at how well that has worked.
Q: Paul Robinson (Lockheed) - You say an IR measurement is based on the detection of cold
air in descent and this terminal effect is the driver of the microburst. However, the structure of
the microburst requires the presence of the ground causing added divergence. This is an inertiai
effect. How can a purely thermal measurement detect this danger?
A: Pat Adamson (Turbulence Prediction Systems) - Essentially what we do is we assume that
a sustained cold air downdraft, as sensed by an aircraft platform, is going to do one of two things:
first, if it is above the outflow it is going to detect the core of the event. When I say sustained, I
am expecting that temperature change that I derived to exist over about thirty seconds. I am not
looking for a single little pulse of cold air, I am looking for a sustained temperature drop that I
calculate as I traverse say a mile and a half at normal aircraft speed. That cold air is going to hit
the ground and diverge. The _cond condition is if in fact I am in the outflow, I expected the
outflow as I move through this mile and a half spatial realm is cold. That is basically how I do it.
Q: Paul Robinson (Lockheed) - By inferring the wind from the temperature you can possibly
detect a microburst type hazardous shear. Can you ever get a hazardous shear without that
temperature change?
A: Pat Adamson (Turbulence Prediction Systems) - Can you ever? Probably.
Q: Paul Robinson (Lockheed) - It is the shear that is going to effect the aircraft, so if your
instrument won't pick up the temperature change, but the shear is still there, then it would not
work as a predictive system.
A: Pat Adamson (Turbulence Prediction Systems) - The way I went at that, Paul, was I
actually took aircraft incident data and I used the algorithm that I have against each and every
event that I could get my hands on. I got the data from the NTSB. For example, yesterday I
looked at the data from event 143, Fred Proctor was good enough to share his model as well as
the actual aircraft data. In every case that i have found so far, and that is probably about sixty
cases including the JAWS actual airborne penetrations, if I use the algorithm I could calculate the
shear from the temperature drop. I assume that the cold air that is falling is going to flow out in
the outflow over a sustained time, not a single little pulse, but over time. That is how I do it.
Q: Paul Robinson (Lockheed) - Using NASA's In Situ algorithm do you alter the systems
properties based on the output of this algorithm?
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A: Pat Adamson (Turbulence Prediction Systems) - We are certainly looking at that. I think
there is some real benefit in taking advantage of a combined system. If you axe going to have a
reactive algorithm on board with a predictive system, I think you should look at the system as a
combined system. We have not really sorted out all the details on that. When you look at the
operational aspects, and that is a lot of what we have been trying to do with the airlines, the
nuisance issue is equally as important as being able to predict the event. If you have high nuisance
obviously it is useless to be able to predict the event, because the pilot won't believe it. We do
not want to repeat that particular lesson. So yes we are trying to best understand how to combine
these systems and make it a better system between the two.
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A MILLIMETER-WAVE RADIOMETER FOR THE DETECTION OF MICROBURST8
R. W. McMiilan
Georgia Institute of Technology
Georgia Tech Research Institute
Atlanta, Georgia 30332
(404) 528-7709
ABSTRACT
This paper describes a millimeter-wave radiometer for the
detection of wind shear from airborne platforms or at airport
terminals. This proposed instrument will operate near the group
of atmospheric oxygen absorptions centered near 60 GHz, which it
will use _o sense temperature from a distance. The instrument
will use two channels to provide two dlfferent tempera£_re_ea -
surements, providing the basis for solution of two equations in
two unknowns, which are range to the wind shear plume and its
temperature. A third channel will measure ambient atmospheric
temperature. Depending on the temperature difference between the
wind-shear plume and ambient, the standard deviation of range
measurement accuracy is expected to be about 1 km at 5 km range,
while the temperature measurement standard deviation will be
about one-fourth the temperature difference between plume and
ambient at this range. The instrument is expected to perform
usefully at ranges up to I0 km, giving adequate warning of the
presence of wind shear even for high performance jet aircraft.
Other atmospheric hazards which might be detected by this radiom-
eter include aircraft wakes and vortices, clear-air turbulence,
and wind rotors, although the latter two phenomena would be
detected by an airborne version of the instrument. A separate
radiometer channel will be provided in the proposed instrument to
detect aircraft wakes and vortices based on perturbation of the
spectrum of microscopic atmospheric temperature fluctuations
caused by the passage of large aircraft.
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MILLIMETER-WAVE RADIOMETER FOR THE DETECTION OF MICROBURST8
1. Introduction
It has been estimated that one-half of all aircraft fatali-
ties are caused by inclement weather. One of the most signifi-
cant manifestations of severe weather, and one which is of great
concern with regard to aviation safety, is the phenomenon of wind
shear, which is a severe downdraft associated with thunderstorms
or other atmospheric instabilities. Since wind shear apparently
originates at high altitudes, it is characterized by temperatQres
lower than the surrounding atmosphere, which provides some basis
for building devices for its detection. A strong correlation has
been established between the temperature of a wlnd-shear event
and its severity. As an example, Figure 1 [i] shows the measured
velocity of a downdraft as a function of its temperature differ-
ence compared to the surrounding air. Figure 2 shows the actual
measured temperature profile of a wind-shear event which was
severe enough to pose danger to aircraft [2]. _
This proposal describes a device for remotedetection of
wind shear based on a millimeter-wave (MMW) radiometer which
operates on a frequency located on the low-frequency skirt of the
group of oxygen absorptions broadly centered at 60 GHz. Such a
radiometer was originally described by Haroules and Brown [3] in
1969, but the availability of much better and more sophisticated
components since the publication of Reference [3] makes the MMW
approach much more attractive. Furthermore, careful measurements
of the oxygen absorption coeffioient as a function of frequency
have been made by Liebe and his coworkers [4], and provide the
basis for accurate determination of both the range to the event
and its temperature differential, which is a measure of its
severity. Range and Temperature measurements are discussed in
Section 2.
To detect a temperature change in the atmosphere with a
radiometer, it is necessary that the frequency of operation be
chosen to lie in an absorption band; otherwise the area of
affected atmosphere will be invisible to the radiometer. It is
also important that the absorption coefficient not be too large,
since the radiometer must be able to see through the atmosphere
between itself and the region of modified temperature. For these
reasons, the frequency of operation must be chosen to lie in a
mildly absorbing region of the atmosphere. The band of oxygen
absorptions located near 60 GHz is a good choice for this appli-
cation because it is broad enough so that the absorption does not
change rapidly with frequency and low enough in frequency that
excellent components are available for radiometer construction.
It will be shown in Section 2 that it is possible to measure both
the range to the microburst plume and the difference in tempera-
ture between it and the surrounding atmosphere. This paper gives
details on the design and construction of a microburst detection
radiometer operating in this absorption band.
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2. Theory of Operation
2.1 Measurements of Range and Temperature of Wlnd Shear Event
The radiometer equation gives the temperature observed by a
radiometer located at position z = 0 looking through a volume of
the atmosphere characterized by temperature T(z) and absorption
coefficient u(z) as
0 z
where TA is the antenna temperature measured by the radiometer.
This equation is simply the sum of the temperature contributions
of all elements of length dz in the path attenuated by the atmo-
sphere between the radiometer and the length element. If a hori-
zontal path and homogeneity of the individual regions of the
atmosphere are assumed, the integration is trivial, and
interesting and useful results are obtained.
In this section, the antenna temperature which one would
expect to observe with a radiometer pointing at a wind shear
plume through a region of absorbing atmosphere will be
calculated. In this analysis, it is assumed that the
temperatures and absorption coefficients are reasonably constant
in each of the volumes of the atmosphere considered. This
requirement will be met if the paths are fairly nearly
horizontal, although it is expected that this concept will still
be viable for slant-path geometry, although the integrations
will be more complex. Consider the geometry shown in Figure 3
in which a radiometer antenna at location h is embedded in a
region of temperature T 1 and absorption coefficient a i extending
to h. The radiometer looks through this medium at a second
region extending to infinity which has a temperature T 2 and
absorption coefficient _z- This geometry will be recognized as
that which occurs in the atmosphere when a wind shear event which
is totally absorbing occurs. If the plume is not totally absorb-
ing, i.e. if it is possible to see through it to the other
side, range and temperature measurements will not be accurate,
but the presence of the wlnd-shear event will still be detected.
This case will be discussed briefly later, but it is likely that
most wind shear events are Characterized by total absorption,
which is certainly the case for Wet microbursts. For dry micro-
bursts of limited horizontal extent, the radiometer will not work
as well, but the addition of other channels would provide better
detection of these types of eveh£s. The number of radiometer
channels and their frequencies must be the subject of further
study.
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Now assume that the radiometer has three channels, one of
which lies in a strongly absorbing region of the atmosphere.
This channel, since its range is limited by absorption,
will simply measure the ambient air temperature T I. The other
two channels, denoted by A and B, are chosen to lie in low and
moderately absorbing regions, respectively. If it is assumed
that these two regions are homogeneous in temperature and absorp-
tion coefficient, it is not difficult to show that the antenna
temperatures observed by these two channels are:
T A = T l +(7" 2
-GAb
-T,)o , (2)
-a8h
• = T, + 7,)e , (3)
Where a A and a s are the absorption coefficients of the atmo-
sphere in region 1 in the low and moderately absorbing bands,
respectively. Note that the absorption coefficient of region 2
does not appear in these equations because region 2 is considered
to be infinite in extent. These two equations can be solved for
the range h to the plume and the temperature difference between
it and the surrounding air. These calculations give:
h = In , (4)
_8-_A Tl T8
B A
T,-T2=(T,-TA)"'-""(T,-Ts) "_-_. (_)
The parameters of interest to the detection of wind-shear
plumes can thus be determined by a radiometer operating in an
absorption band of the atmosphere. Section 3 describes the
design and construction of such a three-channel radiometer oper-
ating on and near the absorption band due to oxygen, which lies
near 60 GHz.
2.2 Detection of Other Atmospheric Hazards
To the extent that other atmospheric hazards are character-
ized by changes in temperature, or by changes in the spectrum of
microscopic temperature fluctuations, the proposed radiometer
would also be able to detect them. It is possible that detection
of clear-alr turbulence (CAT), wind rotors, and aircraft wakes
and vortices could be made using the proposed instrument,
although detections of CAT and wind rotors are primarily airborne
applications. The original proposal for this type radiometer by
Haroules and Brown [3] addressed specifically the detection of
CAT, which causes dozens of injuries every year. Several people
were injured recently when a Delta Airlines flight encountered
CAT over North Georgia. Since this problem was caused by a
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severe downdraft, it is likely that the temperature of the air
mass in front of the aircraft was lower than ambient, and could
therefore be detected by the proposed instrument. Updrafts could
also be detected because of temperature differences between them
and ambient.
Wind rotors have been observed primarily in the Western U.S.
where they result from winds descending mountain slopes, result-
ing in a "horizontal tornado" effect. A wind rotor has been
cited as a possible cause of the crash of a commercial airliner
in Colorado Springs in 1990 [5], with resultant heavy loss of-
life. Since the air masses resulting in wind rotors originate at
high altitudes, it is very likely that their temperature differ-
ences from ambient are significant, and might therefore be a
basis for detection of these events by a millimeter-wave
radiometer. Apparently little is known about the temperature
profiles of these phenomena, since they have heretofore been con-
sidered rather benign, but if an airborne radiometer were to
sense a sharp temperature difference between the air mass ahead
and ambient, it would be wise for a pilot to take evasive action.
Wakes and wing-tip vortices have iong been recognized as
hazards during takeoff and landing operations, especially wbe_
smaller aircraft follow larger. To avoid problems with this type
of turbulence, it is necessary to space takeoffs and landings at
fairly large time intervals so that the disturbances have time to
dissipate. If a means could be found to detect these distur-
bances, it is possible that the frequencies of takeoffs and land-
ings could be increased significantly.
It is possible that the proposed instrument could detect
wakes and vortices by one of two methods. The first involves
sensing the average ambient temperature in the wake of an air-
craft. Since the passage of a large aircraft will mix warmer air
from the boundary layer with cooler air from higher altitudes,
the average ambient temperature of the air behind an airplane
will increase. By using a radiometer with an integration time of
I second, it is possible to detect a temperature difference of
about 0.I degrees Kelvin. Assuming a temperature lapse rate in
the atmosphere of 6 degrees per kilometer, the temperature at an
altitude of I00 m would be about 0.6 degrees lower than that on
the surface. If after the passage of an aircraft the temperature
is observed to be higher than that observed before passage, the
presence of a disturbance might be indicated. When the observed
temperature returns to its nominal value, the disturbance will
have passed. Although this method might work, an approach based
on sensing the temperature spectrum of the disturbance is consid-
ered more viable, and is discussed in the following paragraphs.
The atmosphere is very dynamic, even under apparently stable
conditions of light winds, moderate temperatures, and no precipi-
tation. Its parameters are constantly changing on a microscopic
scale, and these changes affect many observables, for example the
propagation of electromagnetic radiation. A commonly cited exam-
ple of the effects of these microscopic changes is the twinkling
of stars and the shimmering of images when viewed through long
atmospheric paths. One of the parameters which changes on a
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microscopic scale is temperature. The instantaneous temperature
of the atmosphere at a given location may be expressed as the sum
of an average value and a fluctuating component:
T = Tang+ T (6).
The radiometer channel with the long integration time mentioned
above measures Tavg, and the channel to be discussed below mea-
sures Tfluc.
The fluctuating component of the atmospheric temperature has
a power spectrum that has been studied extensively [6,7,8], and
is well understood, provided there are no disturbances in the
atmosphere to perturb it. Measurements of the spectrum of tem-
perature fluctuations are usually made under controlled condi-
tions in open areas far from natural features which would cause
perturbation. Since carefully controlled conditions are required
for precise measurements of the temperature fluctuation spectrum,
it is reasonable to expect that the passage of a large body, such
as an airplane, through the atmosphere would significantly per-
turb this spectrum. It is suggested that this perturbation of
the fluctuation spectrum be studied as a possible basis for the
detection of wake and vortex turbulence. One of the channels of
the three-channel radiometer designed to detect wind shear would
be used for this purpose. It would not even be necessary to add
another channel, since a separate integrator could be added to an
existing channel. The output of this integrator, which would
have a very short time constant for detection of fast fluctua-
tions, would be fed into a computer which would calculate the
fourier transform of the amplitude fluctuations, thus giving the
power spectrum. This process would be continuous, so that any
short-term change in the spectrum could be detected in a very
short time. The dissipation time of the turbulence would then be
the time required for the spectrum to return to normal within
prescribed limits. As mentioned above, this characteristic of
the atmosphere might also be used to detect wind rotors, or might
serve as a method complementary to that involving average temper-
ature changes. The next section discusses in detail the design
of a radiometer for detection of wind shear and other atmospheric
anomalies.
3. Approach
Figure 4 is a block diagram of the radiometer. Radiation is
collected by the horn/lens antenna and fed into a full waveguide
band mixer covering the 40 - 60 GHz band This mixer is pumped by
a Gunn local oscillator operating at a frequency of 43 GHz. The
signal input from the antenna is through a waveguide section with
dimensions chosen to cut off all radiation at frequencies lower
than about 45 GHz, so that the superheterodyne image frequencies
are effectively eliminated, making this instrument a single-
sideband radiometer. The output of this mixer feeds an interme-
diate frequency amplifier covering the range 6 - 18 GHz. The
output of this amplifier is split into three channels of 6 - 8, 9
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- 11, and 16 - 18 GHz by a power splitter followed by bandpass
filters. These three bands correspond to the signal frequency
bands of 49 - 51, 52 - 54, and 59 - 61GHz, with the images of
these frequencies cut off by the input waveguide filter. The
receiver will then see the atmospheric temperature in each of the
above three channels without the necessity for averaging with
image channels. Each of these IFs is fed into an amplifier,
whose output is detected and passed into the data processing sys-
tem. Figure 5 shows the relationship of the three radiometer
channels to the 60 GHz oxygen absorption band, calculated using
the method devised by Liebe and Layton.
Measurements of the temperature fluctuation spectrum are
made by providing a separate integrator with a short time con-
stant for the 52-54 GHz channel. Figure 4 shows that this chan-
nel may be added by simply coupling the 9-11GHz detector output
into two separate integrators. The time constant of this
spectrum channel must be short enough to resolve the highest fre-
quency fluctuations of interest, but not so short that system
noise becomes comparable to temperature fluctuations. Some
experimentation will be required to determine the optimum time
constant for this channel, although Figure 4 shows a value of 0.i
sec. The output of this spectrum channel is input to the com-
puter, which calculates a fourier transform to arrive at the tem-
perature fluctuation spectrum. This process is done
continuously, so that changes in the fluctuation spectrum caused
by the passage of aircraft can be easily observed by comparing
these spectra before and after.
The existing 9-11GHz radiometer channel, which has a time
constant of 0.5 sec, will be used to measure the average tempera-
ture of the air mass behind the aircraft to look for changes due
to turbulence. It is possible that a separate integrator will
also be used for this purpose, since one might prefer a slightly
longer time constant for better resolution.
The radiometer is calibrated by periodically using the input
to the antenna to 10ok alternatively at hot and cold loads of
known temperatures. Calibration is necessary to negate the
effects of changes in gain of the mixer and IF amplifiers. In
the future, if these components can be made more stable and
housed in a temperature controlled enclosure, it may be possible
to build a radiometer requiring calibration only at the beginning
of a measurement cycle, so that the wind-shear radiometer could
be built with no moving parts.
In the data processing system, the range to the plume and
its temperature are calculated using Equations (4) and (5). If
no microburst is present, all of the channels will read the same
temperature, and the result of calculating range and temperature
difference will just be random fluctuations whose amplitude will
be a function of system noise. It will be possible to devise
algorithms which will recognize a given threshold temperature
change and be able to determine whether the change is consistent
over some given number of samples. If so, the data processor
will calculate a range and give a warning based on the measured
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_T. As the wind shear comes closer to the radiometer, the range
and temperature measurements will become more accurate, and false
alarms will happen less often.
The absorption band of oxygen lying near 60 GHz is the ideal
range of frequencies in which to operate a temperature sensing
radiometer. Unlike water vapor, another possibility, which
varies widely in concentration from one location to another,
the mixing ratio of oxygen is constant throughout the world.
Furthermore, due to the careful work of H. J. Liebe and cowQrk-
ers [4] at the National Telecommunications Information
Agency, the absorption coefficients of oxygen are known to an
accuracy of 0.i dB/km over the range of atmospheric conditions
likely to be encountered under microburst conditions. These
measurements include the effects of water vapor, rain, snow, and
fog. Liebe is currently engaged in a project which has the goal
of increasing this accuracy to the order of 0.01 dB/km, which
will improve the performance of the wind-shear radiometer, as
will be discussed in Section 4.
The fact that the three radiometer channels respond to
regions of the atmosphere at different ranges is accounted for by
the concept of the weighting function, which is defined as the
coefficient of temperature in the antenna temperature integral
Equation (I). For horizontal propagation, where a and T vary
little with range, the weighting function is just a(z)exp[-a(z)]
where z is range. Since a varies litt]e with range for a hori-
zontal path, it is taken to be constant for the case of interest.
It will be recognized that equations (I) and (2) result from
solving this integral for constant a and T for the two regions
considered. The weighting functions for the three radiometer
channels defined by Figure 3 are shown in Figure 6. Note that
the weighting for the 59-61 GHz channel is heavily biased to
short ranges, while that for the 49-51 GHz channel shows nearly
uniform weighting independent of range. This result is in con-
trast to the downlooking weighting functions normally shown for
the oxygen absorption, which show well-defined peaks because of
decreasing attenuation as frequency deviates from the center of
the oxygen absorptions.
The concept of the weighting function provides a means for
measuring the horizontal temperature profile of the atmosphere.
By choosing several radiometer channels centered at different
frequencies on the low-frequency skirt of the oxygen absorption,
it would be possible to sense the temperature at as many differ-
ent ranges in front of the radiometer, glving the desired pro-
file, assuming the various regions have sharply defined
boundaries. Since these weighting functions are not peaked as
are those used for downlooking radiometry, the measurements would
not be as accurate as for the downiooking case, but the possibil-
ity exists for probing fairly complex temperature profiles within
wind shear events, such as that shown in Figure 2. However, for
general aviation use, the three-channel radiometer described
above is considered adequate.
_5
Z
O
I--
(3.
o
o o
b_ z
Z
m
I---
-r-
L_
bJ
(D
d
_ -t-_
I.'3
d
4-
J
4-
J-
4-
4.
d o d
_r
:t
f
ij.
,/I
II'}
f'i
O
11
iH
It
7
O
O
cO
L, j
_-- LLJ
zZ
"1-
c0()
I.-- T
O_ I
z
W +
"I-
O
IN
-I-
!
Cn
O
,,--I
Ld
Z
Z
"1-
O
N
L_
6'3
I
,-,I
14
O
_J
_J
0
0
U
4_
1-1
-,-.t _
_ .,--i
iU
_O
-,..t _
[]
_1 ]c.::JH]ANI NI NOIION£1_-I DNIIHDI]M
796
4. Range and Temperature Error Calculations
Using the above equations for range and temperature differ-
ence, the known accuracies in the determination of oxygen attenu-
ation coefficients, and the expected noise performance of the
three radiometer channels, it is possible to calculate the rms
error in the measurement of these important parameters. For any
function of n variables /(xl,x2 .... x,), the variance is given by
0 2 = o,. (6)
/ 8x,
Since we have closed-form expressions for h and T 1 - T2, it is
not difficult to calculate these errors, but first it is
necessary to determine the errors for the variables x i. We
assume that we know the oxygen absorption to an rms accuracy of
0.i dB/km. The accuracies with which we know the temperatures
are determined by the radiometer equation for minimum detectable
temperature
_ ( T sys + T ant )
ATm'n = , R/ T, ' (7)
where K is a constant (taken to be 1.5 which accounts for gain
fluctuations), Tsy s is system noise temperature, Tan t is
antenna temperature, B is system bandwidth, and • is integration
time. The typical single-sideband noise figure of the mixer-
amplifier combination proposed for use in this application is i0
dB over the range 49-61 GHz. Using Equation (7), the minimum
detectable temperature of the three channels is then 0.14
degrees, assuming an integration time of 0.5 s and a band-
width of 2 GHz for all channels. These values then become the
standard deviations of the errors in measuring TI, TA, and TB
which are substituted into Equation (6) for calculation of
the range and temperature measurement errors. The other
errors used in this calculation are the errors in the determi-
nation of the 02 attenuation, which have a standard deviation of
0.i dB/km = 0.04 km -I as mentioned above.
Using the equations for range and temperature difference
derived above, the error Equation (6), and the standard
deviations discussed in the last paragraph, it is possible to
calculate the errors in determination of range and temperature
difference for a radiometer with the given noise performance.
The results of the range measurement error calculations are given
in Figure 7 as a function of range for ATs of 5, i0, 20, and 30
degrees. Note that range measurement is more accurate for the
larger temperature differences, as expected. The temperature
measurement errors are shown in Figure 8, using the same
parameters. At a range of 5 km, the range measurement error has
a standard deviation of about 2 km, and the temperature
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measurement error standard deviation is about one,thlrd the
temperature difference between the mlcroburst plume and ambient
for all cases.
It is possible to show that more than half these errors at 5
km is due to uncertainty in our knowledge of the oxygen absorp-
tion coefficient. If the work being done by Liebe [4], in which
the accuracy of these absorptions can be known to 0.01 dB/km, can
be applied to this radiometer, its range and temperature measure-
ment accuracy can be improved considerably. This feature of the
milllmeter-wave system emphasizes a significant advantage over
the infrared system, which operates at a wavelength of about 16
microns. Absorptions in the infrared are not known to great
accuracy, and even if they were, the presence of literally thou-
sands of water vapor absorptions in this region would make the
determination of absorption nearly impossible because of the
great variation in water vapor concentration from place to place.
Because of these limitations, it would probably be impossible to
measure accurately the range and temperature of a microburst
using an infrared system, although detection of its presence is
certainly possible.
5. Evaluation of Wind-Shear Radiometer Performance
Although wind-shear events are very hazardous to aircraft,
they still occur very rarely. Because of this rarity in occur-
rence, adequate testing of the radiometer will be a problem. For
proper testing of this instrument, it is necessary for it to view
a region of the atmosphere that is at ambient temperature for
distances near the point of the test and colder than ambient for
regions further away. Fortunately, these requirements are met by
the vertical temperature profile of the atmosphere, which will be
near ambient temperature near the surface, but will decrease in
temperature at an approximate lapse rate of -6 degrees centigrade
per kilometer above the surface. The temperature of the atmo-
sphere as viewed by an uplooking radiometer is given by Equation
(i), with the addition of a small correction due to the cosmic
background temperature attenuated by the atmosphere, which is
negligible at these frequencies of interest. By looking upward
into the clear sky, the radiometer will see different tempera-
tures in each of its three channels, in a manner similar to what
it would see by looking horizontally through the atmosphere at a
wind-shear plume. The 59-61 GHz channel would measure the ambi-
ent temperature, while the 52-54 and the 49-51 GHz channels would
see progressively lower temperatures, since they would see higher
into the atmosphere where the temperatures are lower. In this
way, the data processing system associated with this instrument
would "think" that it is seeing a wind shear plume at a given
range. By solving Equation (I) numerically for the temperatures
in the three channels corresponding to the prevailing atmospheric
conditions, it will be possible to arrive at the range and tem-
perature of the microburst which the radiometer "thinks" it sees.
In this way the accuracy of the instrument and its associated
data processing algorithms can be assessed. Of course, the
instrument will also be used to look horizontally at inclement
weather to determine its capability for detecting wind shear if
800
it does occur, but the vertlcal-looking, clear-sky tests
described above will probably yield a more accurate measure of
system performance.
For evaluating the ability of the radiometer to detect air-
craft wakes and vortices, it will be necessary to place the
instrument near an airport so that these phenomena occur with
some regularity. The radiometer would simply be pointed at the
runway glide path and the observed temperature spectra would be
processed as described above.
9. Summary
We have described a three-channel radiometer based on
off-the-shelf parts which we expect to be able to detect the
difference in temperature between a microburst plume and ambi-
ent air with good accuracy. This instrument, which uses the
family of oxygen absorptions centered near 60 GHz as an
emitter to measure temperature, would have no moving parts (as-
suming that calibration issues can be resolved) and would not
require a cooled detector. This instrument will be capable of
measuring both the range to a wind-shear event and its tempera-
ture, which is a measure of its severity. A separate radiometer
channel senses the atmospheric temperature fluctuation spectrum
for detection of aircraft wakes and vortices. Furthermore, it
would have a significant advantage over infrared instruments
based on the same principle in propagation through atmospheric
aerosols such as clouds and dust, and a marginal advantage
in propagation through rain. Another advantage of the millime-
ter wave instrument over the infrared instrument is based on our
knowledge of atmospheric attenuation near 60 GHz. This
attenuation is known to high accuracy for a wide variety of atmo-
spheric conditions, including fog, rain , high humidity, and even
snow. The large number of atmospheric species with transitions
in the infrared bands and our lack of knowledge about them means
that it is difficult to know the attenuation coefficients at
these wavelengths. This problem is made especially severe by the
presence of water vapor, which has literally thousands of trans-
itions in the IR bands and whose concentration varies widely from
place to place. Because of the careful work of H. J. Liebe and
his coworkers, this problem does not exist for the proposed
millimeter-wave instrument, since atmospheric absorption coeffi-
cients in the oxygen bands are known to an accuracy of 0.i dB/km,
with the promise of even better accuracy based on later work.
The proposed instrument would probably be used most effec-
tively on board aircraft, where it might also be able to detect
clear air turbulence and wind rotors. For ground-based
applications, it would supplement the existing terminal doppler
weather radar systems at large airports and would serve as a
stand alone wind shear detector for smaller airports. In ground-
based applications, the radiometer might also be able to detect
wingtip vortices.
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A Millimeter-Wave Radiometer for Detecting of Microbursts
Questions and Answers
Q: Phil Brockman (NASA Langley) - I used to do a lot of measurements with passive infrared,
and it seemed like the signal would depend on the temperature difference and also a difference in
the absorption or emissivity. If you are looking downward you should see a change in water
vapor concentration. What happens if you go into rain, where you are coming out of clear air and
then you hit some rain? The emissivity and absorption will probably change. Sometime along the
line I would like to hear some of the infrared people address this issue.
A: Bob McMillan (Georgia Tech) - Well rain is a problem of course. At any frequency above
30 or 40 gigahertz the attenuation is almost constant because you are in the knee of the
absorption/scattering region. I think that this instrument would probably perform very similarly to
the infrared instrument in rain. I do not think there is very much difference in absorption or
scattering.
Q: Phil Brockman (NASA Langley) - If you are coming out of clear air and then you hit rain,
there is a sudden change. Do you have a problem when that happens?
A: Bob McMillan (Georgia Tech) - Some of the pictures that I have seen in the last couple of
days have shown a microburst cell imbedded in a huge rainstorm. I think this instrument would
have trouble seeing through the rain to that cell. If the rain were maybe less than four millimeters
per hour, then it might would be able to detect it. But in Florida for example, I know you get 60
or 100 millimeter per hour rains. I think most of us have trouble with that kind of weather.
Q: Kim Elmore (NCAR) - Aside from this instruments potential to see wing tip vorticies and
perhaps clear air turbulence. What do you see as its ability to tell us things that the TDWR could
not tell us in a microburst type of environment.
A: Bob McMillan (Georgia Tech) - I don't think there is anything that this instrument can tell
us that the TDWR couldn't. Maybe I should address your question from the point of view of the
airborne radars. This instrument and the infrared instrument should be able to detect stuff that is
associated with clear air and with no scatters, because it depends on temperature and not back
scatter. I guess the TDWR has so much power that it sees these things even in clear air.
Pete Sinclair (Colorado State University) - You might consider including the third layer behind
the microburst into the model that you have. We have found with the infrared that this is an area
that will leak through the back of the microburst, especially in Denver where the precipitation is
light. That field of radiance is an important factor and if you do not take that into account the
microburst looks a lot better than it really is.
Bob McMillan (Georgia Tech) - That is an excellent point. I think what we would do in the
case of clear air is to increase the absorption coefficients so the instrument does not see through.
We would move those RF channels up on the oxygen line so it does not see as far. In that case
there would be less leakage. We have actually done that. We have looked at the effect of having
that.
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ColoradoState University Research
QuestionsandAnswers
Q: Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - Now that you have done these experiments, how would
you relate the measurables, the observables of the IR instrument, to aircraft hazard?
A: Pete Sinclair (Colorado State University) - That is our summer program. Looking at this
last example, with the detached or displaced vortex, it is a very weak microburst in terms of
temperature difference. But, it is a great hazard, depending on what altitude you are at and what
orientation you are flying with respect to the microburst. It is not really clear to us that we should
make a forecast from the temperature difference directly without knowing what the trajectory of
the aircraft is in relation to the microburst structure. I can't answer how we do that right now, but
I think that is the bottom line in this whole thing.
Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - So I would interpret your comment to mean, that is an
unsolved problem in your mind.
Pete Sinclair (Colorado State University) - Well, it is unsolved. We have a lot of data that we
could put a model together with and give you a forecast. But, I would be worried fight now that
with a slightly different approach or departure mode we would have some false alarms. I think
more study needs to be made on that.
Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - Based on our discussion and some of the questions you have
asked, you seem to have a very strong opinion about probing these things under five hundred feet,
and I think that is good from a _ientific point of view. But, the whole idea of the airborne
systems technology work, and what operators need, is to avoid getting there based on
measurements down there. We are not trying to quantify how strong they can be. We are sitting
outside pinging on them, and we are not going to go in there if those measurements show a
hazard.
Pete Sinclair (Colorado State University) - if you are going to make a model or a prediction,
you have to know what is there, for those critical cases when the measurements that we ate
making, like you are with the radar, are slightly higher.
Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - All of the radar data you saw yesterday was two degrees
below the horizon. The measurements were being made right down into the ground.
Pete Sinclair (Colorado State University) - That is right. We are trying to verify from the flight
measurements, what those radar values really mean, and what our radiometer measurements really
mean.
Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - I can understand the desire to scale the radiometer
observable to an expected hazard, but the pulse Doppler systems make a direct measurement.
Pete Sinclair (Colorado State University) - They do. But if you average over a kilometer, I
think for some aircraft you miss important parts of the velocity spectrum that can affect them,
even for the heavies that get very close to the ground. We have a different hazard factor. In the
8O7
hazard factor that you developed we have added a height term. When you get down to 50 meters
we are jumping that hazard factor way up. Any moderate hazard factor at 50 meters is a lot
different than at say 500 meters.
Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - Obviously, but that is the whole idea of ren_0te _nsing. You
are sitting outside pinging on it, and making a decision before you go there. The other thing is the
scaling on your balsa vanes and picking a 250 meter averaging length, you are looking at scales of
motion that just absolutely don't effect airplanes to any great extent. You are seeing small scale,
you are not talking about long term effects. With the thrust to weight you have in that airplane, if
you encountered a 0.3 hazard you would not be here today, if they were sustained. Those .
spurious peaks are not of significant interes t. : : :
Pete Sinclair (Colorado State University) - No, I disagree with you Roland. They are not
spurious peaks, they ate continuous values that are building up. We are not looking at, for
example, turbulence inside a thunderstorm where we have giant peaks. We are looking at a field
that is coherent, that is either downward or upward, it has peak values, but the field is coherent
and in the average it is not affected by the spurious peak. It is very strong. The UnuSual _int
about this and that concerned us a lot is that once you get close to the ground we are worded
about the turbulence because in our airplane turbulence is a big factor. These things are flowing
relatively smoothly, not like a thunderstorm or a convective situation. We do not get theG :
loading and the vane response from turbulence that we would normally. These are definite build
ups and definite shear layers.
Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - We will discuss this some more, but 0.25 and 0.3's in vertical
motion, you are talking five to six thousand feet per minute of downdraft. Clearly that Cessna
could not handle that for any length of time.
Pete Sinclair (Colorado State University) - Our true airspeeds are about 55 to 60 meters per
second. I am talking 10 to 15 meters per second of downdraft. That is going to give you a 0.2
value. You have to remember we are traveling less than half the airspeed of what you guys are.
Roland Bowles (NASA Langley)- But that makes the effect on the airplane flight-path-angle
depression even worse, because it is scaled as one over the airspeed. You just would not be here
if that were true, for any significant amount of time.
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The focus of this talk is on comparing Terminal Doppler Weather Radar
(TDWR) and airborne wind shear data in computing a microburst hazard index
called the F factor. The TDWR is a ground-based system for detecting wind shear
hazards to aviation in the terminal area. The Federal Aviation Administration will
begin deploying TDWR units near 45 airports in late 1992. As part of this develop-
ment effort, M.I.T. Lincoln L,aboratory operates under F.A.A. support a TDWR
testbed radar in Orlando, F1..
During the past two years, a series of flight tests has been conducted with
instrumented aircraft penetrating microburst events while under testbcd radar sur-
veillance. These tests were carried out with a Cessna Citation !1 aircraft operated by
the University of North Dakota (UND) Center for Aerospace Sciences in 1990, and a
Boeing 737 operated by NASA Langley Research Center in 1991. A large data base
of approximately 60 instrumented mlcrobtwst penetrations has been obtained from
these flights.
The test flights in 1990 included the first-ever demons!ration of real=time
transmission of TDWR nlicroburst graphical warnings to an aircraft for cockpit dis-
play. A similar demonstration was carried _ut in 1991, with the TDWR microburst
alerts being used to direct the NASA aircraft in making microburst penetrations.
Post-flight analysis was performed t!ndcr NASA funding to compare the F
factor (Bowles & Targ, 1988) as measured by aircraft in situ sensors and estimated
from TDWR microburst alarms. It was fotmd thai improvements are needed in the
'['he work described here was perl'ormed under Air l:oret! ('tmtract No. F I9_28-90-C-0002,
and was sponsored by the Federal Aviatitm Adrui_fislratitm aud the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration. The IJnted States (hwernmcnt assumes no liability for its content or
use thereo[.
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TDWR microburst alarm generation process to allow the aircraft F fad_tar to be esti-
mated accurately. Thesc improvements include: shear-based outflow detection,
physical model-based alarm representation, and compensation for the dependence
of outflow intensity on altitude. The rationale for these improvements Will now be
discussed. " "
The aircraft F factor can be estimated from TDWR microburst alarms using a
formula proposed by Bowles (1988):
F-rDWR = K' (AV/AR) [ GS/g + 2h/TAS 1 =Fx +Fz ( 1 )
where AV/AR is the TDWR-rne,'isured shear, GS is the aircraft ground speed, g is
gravitational acceleration, h is the radar beam height and TAS is the aircraft true
airspeed. K' is a factor which attempts to rclatc the average shear in the microburst,
z_V/AR, to the peak shear in the microburst over a 1 km distance. The GS/g term
corresponds to the horizontal component of F (Fx) and the 2h/TAS term is an esti-
mate of the vertical (downdraft) component of F (Fz). It should be noted that the
equation assumes that the aircraft penetrates through the center of the microburst.
It was found that applying Equation i to current TDWR microburst alarms
often overestimates the aircraft F factor. Examination of TDWR radar data shows
that strong microbursts often contain small regions of intense shear inside a larger
region of less intense shear. These intensc shear regions are not identified by the
current microburst detection algorithm, which attempts to identify the peak-to-peak
velocity loss, rather than shear. Because of lhis, the shear associated with a micro-
burst alarm is undereslimatcd for strong microbursts. Applying the K' factor to this
underestimated shear leads to the correct F factor estimate for strong mierobursts,
but overestimates the F factor for weak microbursts.
In order to beltcr quantify the shear for use in Equation 1, a least-squares
shear estimator was developed. The base polar radar data was first smoothed using a
0.5 km x 0.5 km median filler. The least .sqtJares eslimator was then applied over a
seven-gate window of TDWR velocity data t'_r an effcctive distance of 0.9 km (i.e., 6
gates center-to-center x 150 m per g_te). The corresponding shear values were then
applied to the t'ollowing equation:
i: sill_Ak = (dV/dR)Ji, [ (]S/.e + 2h/TAS ] (2)
where (dV/dR)Jh is the least--squares shear at the radar beam height.
It was found tlat_t Equation 2 was an improvement but still often overestimated
the aircraft F factor. Vurtlaer examination t_l the radar data showed that there was a
strong dependence of the _utflow strength _n t_ltitude. Work by Mark lsaminger and
Paul Biron of Lincoha showed that the outfl_w strength decreases linearly with height
above the surface. This result was consistent with an analytical model of microburst
outflows developcd by Vicroy of NASA I .tmgley (1991); this model is a naodification
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of an earlier model developedby Osegueraand Bowles (1988). In the Vicroy and
Oseguera & Bowles models, the horizontal shear is described by a shaping function,
p(z), which is zero at the surface, reaches a peak at height hm and then drops off with
increasing altitude.
Using the altitude shaping function, p(z), the horizontal shear at the aircraft
altitude, a, can be estimated:
(dWdR)l, = (dV/dR)lh ] p(a)/p(h) ] (3)
and the revised F factor estimate can be written as:
F ALT.CORR. = (dV/dR)la [ GS/g + 2aPFAS ] (4)
where we now use the aircraft altitude, a, in the downdraft estimation term, 2a/TAS.
This formula reflects the concept that as the aircraft altitude increases, the horizontal
shear will decrease but the downdraft component will increase.
Equation 4 was found to estimate the F,, component quite accurately, but still
tends to overestimate the Fz component. Further reflection shows that the 2a/TAS
term leads to an overestimate of the vertical component, since it is assumed that the
aircraft flies directly through the center of the microburst. In fact, many of the pene-
trations were made at the edge of the outflow where the Vicroy model predicts an
updraft, rather than a downdraft.
Accordingly, a final modification was teslcd which divided the aircraft data
into center and edge penetrations. For center penetrations, the unmodified Equation
4 was used; for edge penetrations, the vertical component estimator was changed
to -a/TAS (i.e., an updraft at the edge equal to half the center downdraft):
F UlOR.coRR. = (dV/dR)], [ (;S/g + 2a/TAS 1, center
= (dV/dR)]_, [ GS/g - a/TAS [, edge
(5a)
(5b)
Applying Equation 5 yielded an improvement in the mean Fz component, however,
the data points were clustered as either too high or too low. A further refinement
would be to scale the vertical compensation acc_utlirl_ tO distance from the outflow
center.
These results lead to the notion lhal several improvements could be made to
the existing TDWR microbtnrst recognition algorithna to allow accurate F factor esti-
mation. First, shear-based outflow detection at multiple thresholds would allow re-
gions of intense shear to be identified inside of larger outflow regions. Second, these
shear regions could bc tised to create a microburst representation based on a physical
model consisting of an outflow center and an outflow edge. Third, an analytic micro-
burst model or other technique could be tvscd to compensate for the dependence of
outflow intensity on altitude. Frourth, the impu'ovcd microburst representation could
815
be used to estimate the vertical component of the microburst based on distance from
the outflow center.
A key goal for operations during the summer of 1992 will be to more accurate-
ly characterize the altitude dependence of micr_burst outflows, it is planned to ac-
complish this goal by carrying out rapid, low-altitude scans of microburst outflows
by three radars during aircraft penetrations. The three radars will be the TDWR
testbed plus two C'band radars operated ur_lcr I:.A.A. funding byd_e University of
North Dakota and Massachusetts Institute of Technology. These radars are situated
in such a fashion to allow triple-Doppler reconstruction of the three-dimensional
wind fields at the Orlando airport. These triple-Doppler wind field reconstructions
will allow both the horizontal and vertical components measured by airborne and
ground-based sensors to be compared.
In summary, a large data base of instrumented microburst penetrations while
under TDWR testbed radar surveillance has been ob(ained 0vet the past two years at
Orlando. These tests also marked the first-ever demonstration of real-time data link
transmission of TDWR microburst alerts to aircraft for graphical display in the cock-
pit. Additional flight tests will be performed in 1992, including penetrations with
rapid update, low-altitude triple-Doppler radar scans.
Sixty microburst penetrations have been examined to determine how well the
aircraft F factor can be estimated from TDWR data. Analysis of the data shows that
several improvements to the current microhurst recognition algorithm would be
needed to allow the aircraft F fat(or to be accurately estimated. These improvements
would improve the quality of the microburst alerts currently supplied to ATC person-
nel and, in the future, supplied to pilots directly via Mode S Data Link.
References:
1. Bowles, R.I,. and R. Targ: Wind Sht.ar I)etection and Avoidance: Airborne
Systems Perspective, lntcrn_ltional Congress t_[" Aeronautical Sciences,
Jerusalem, lsrzlcl, Augttst-Scl_tcnal)cr, I')88.
2. Vicroy, D.D.: A Simple, Analytical, Axisymmctric Microburst Model for
Downdraft Estimation, NASA Technical Mcn'lorandum 104053, NASA Langley
Research Center, tlampton, VA, 13cbru:_ry, 1991.
3. Oseguera, R.M., and R.I.. I_,owles: A SirnpIc, Analytic 3-l)irnensional Downburst
Model Based on l_ourldary l_.aycr Stagn_tion I:low, NASA Technical Memo-
randum 100632, NASA I_.mglcy Rcscarch Ccntcr, July, ]988.
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The Orlando TDWR Testbed and Airborne Wind Shear
Data Comparison Results
Questions and Answers
Q: Dan Vicroy (NASA Langley) - You pointed out some improvements or possible
improvements to the TDWR algorithms. Can you comment on the implementation issues and
what kind of time line you are looking at for implementing these improvements?
A: Steve Campbell (MIT Lincoln Lab.) - The TDWR was implemented as a very fast track
program. We knew that there would be some refinements. When the TDWR was designed, the
idea was that all you needed to do was detect the change in velocity. I think we now understand
that it is not true. There are really two avenues through which we could make improvements.
One is that the FAA expects to upgrade the TDWR algorithmS over a _riod _time. The other
is that there is another program which is starung up _e_ the integrat_e_i_ai_Weather
System Program in which we will be in66rporfftirig data-'t'rom a number of sources, TDWR,
surface observations and aircraft data. That may-also be an avenue for _ing these
improvements. As far as how long that is going to take, well it is going to take some years: I
think we are at least plugged into that process,_
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TDWR 1991 Program Review
Questions and Answers
Q: Branimir Dulic (Transport Canada) - Could you elaborate on that polarometric radar.
What kind of radar is it?
A: Kim Eimore (NCAR) - Well, it is a 10 centimeter radar, it is the NCAR CP2 radar. We can
look at all kinds of things. We can look at KDP, PDP, linear depolarization ratios, ZDR, plus we
actually have dual band radar capability, we have X band and S band. It is linear polarization.
NOAA operates a circular polarization radar, but we operate linear polarization, horizontal, and
vertical. We have a polarization switch so we can change from one to the other. Typically with
polarometric radars, because you interlace pulses, you cut your Nyquist interval in half. We are
going to install a processor where we can retain the Nyquist interval because we will use phase
information from both polarizations instead of just horizontal.
Q: Joe Youssefl (Honeywell) - The false alert rates that you quoted, one or two percent, what
are the units for that?
A: Jim Evans (MIT) - They are not false alert rates. They are probabilities that when you issue
an alert that it is false. There is an important difference between this and the way people are
talking about false alert rates with respect to the airborne systems. In the ground based systems,
we have been convinced that from a pilot's belief view point you should have a high probability
that when we present you alert that it actually is a valid alert. If you take false alert rates, it turns
out most of the time there is no weather. If you actually had a false alert rate as low as one a
week, it might mean that the probability when you hear an alert that it is false could be 90%.
Q: Joe Youssefi (Honeywell) - Let me see if I understand. If you give a hundred alerts the
probability would be that there is one out of the hundred that is false?
A: Kim Elmore (NCAR) - That is correct.
Q: Joe Youssefi (Honeywell) - I had a second question relating to the issue of the dry
microburst season in Denver.
A: Kim Elmore (NCAR) - I knew that was going to come up. Pete Sinclair and us seem to be
somewhat at odds_-NASA will be in Denver for basically the month of July, which was the month
that Dr. Sinclair suggested they avoid. Our studies have found that while June is a great month
for microbursts, they tend to also be associated with hail. So, if you just want to study microburst
that is fine, but if want to fly airplanes through them that is not fine. So we counseled them to
avoid June. Our experience has been that sometime in August we usually lose the Southwest
monsoon over the Denver area which gives us the mid level moisture that we need for the dry low
reflectivity microburst. Now it is absolutely true that we could have microbursts into October,
certainly. But, our work has found that the highest frequency of them tends to be sometime in
July. Those of you that did not know that Denver had a monsoon season it does.
874
Q: Pat Adamson (Turbulence Prediction Systems) - Are you doing a calculation of the
F-factor? If so, are you using a similar formula or has work been done in that area?
A: Kim Elmore (NCAR) - From our shear base stuff we will be calculating F this season. We
will be doing it essentially the same way that Steve and NASA do it.
Q: Pat Adamson (Turbulence Prediction Systems) - So the formula for a vertical computation
is the same for wet or dry microburst?
A: Kim Elmore (NCAR) - Yes.
875
876
Session X. Flight Management Research
._t_,{. [;I.A;_iK I'_OT F!LMED
877
878
Session X. Flight Management Research N 9 3 - 1 4 8 5 3
Experimental Evaluation of Candidate Graphical Microburst Alert Displays
Craig Wanke, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Dr. R. John Hansman, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Experimental Evaluation of Candidate Graphical Microburst Alert Displays
Questions and Answers
Q: Unknown - Did you look at the cases where perhaps where there was a disagreement
between ground based information or airborne sensor data?
A: Craig Wanke (MIT) - We did not. That is actually one of the major points. For the data
fusion cases we showed two icons that were essentially overlaid. Clearly there is a significant
problem if those do not line up. If you have a computer algorithm that attempts to interpret that
in a realizable way, that is probably more effective than showing the pilot the two non agreeing
icons ona three mile fin',d and asking him to figure out what is really going on. That is really one
of the biggest arguments for data fusion. But, that is something that we could not really test in
our experiment.
Bob Hall (Airline Pilots Association) - I don't have a question, but I wanted to find the
appropriate time to make a comment to the group here. This looked like it might be a good time
to do that. I wanted to offer a few words of encouragement and motivation to the industry from
the ultimate end user, which are the pilots. As you are probably aware, ALPA has been very
active in this whole wind shear endeavor for probably over ten years, even before some of the
major accidents occurred. We would like to think that we were instrumental in getting some of
the FAR changes which mandated the reactive devices that are going into our cockpits now. We
are very thankful to be getting these reactive devices into our cockpits. As nice as the reactive
device is, we kind of view it as a nice back up. What we would really like to have is a predictive
systems, which is what we are talking about in this conference today. A few years ago we were
very concerned that even though we had gotten the reactive devices mandated, we were
concerned that the industry would drop all the research and development on the predictive
devices. We were concerned that in endorsing those changes we might lose out in what we really
wanted. I am just here to emphasize and motivate you to keep up the good work. We are very
glad to see the progress that is being made, especially in the Doppler radar. I was a little
discouraged several years ago about the clutter problems. It looks like those have been really
overcome and now we are pressing on to talking about how do we get the information to the
cockpit. So please keep up the good work, and be assured that pilots do want accurate, reliable,
predictive systems that will help us to avoid the wind shear hazards.
Q: Howard Williams (Gulfstream Aerospace) - I believe we can echo what has just been
stated. Relative to your pilot evaluation, did you have any FAA pilots as part of the team7
A: Craig Wanke (MIT) - No, we did not. These were all airline pilots.
Q: Howard Williams (Gulfstream Aerospace) - Do you feel that these types of displays are
certifiable or have you reached that stage yet?
A: Craig Wanke (MIT) - We haven't really reached that stage yet. We haven't thought
seriously about the certifiability issues.
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John Hansman (MIT) - We see what we are doing more as baseline work. We are not trying to
certify a specific display, but provide baseline data on the utility of these type o_ &sp ,y concepts.
As you go into a particular display configuration there will be certifiability issues. These were not
designed to be certified displays.
Q: Sam Shirck (Continental Airlines) - Did you make any studies that involved TCAS on your
displays?
A: Craig Wanke (MIT) - No we did not.
Sam Shirck (Continental Airlines) - I would encourage you, if your marching orders permit, to
look at an independent display for hazards such as TCAS and wind shear. As much as I like to
see wind shear on a moving map, I don't think we can put much more on an EHSI than we have
right now. If you have ever ridden in the cockpit going into the Denver area, and watch what
happens on the TCAS system on an EFIS, it is very exciting. Although the engineering is capable
of putting all this stuff on there, I am not sure that we as pilots can get it off and use it. TCAS is
a very important part of this whole display issue. I would encourage you to investigate a
dedicated display for hazards and to involve the TCAS scenarios in that.
A: Craig Wanke (MIT) - That is certainly a consideration and that is something that probably
should be worked on, but I don't know that we have any plans to do TCAS studies. We are doing
some similar stuff with terrain alerting displays.
John Hansman (MIT) - That is a very valid point. The whole issue of display clutter and display
priority is a critical issue for this, for data link, for a whole bunch of areas. What do you do when
you have two high priority messages that over write? Craig alluded to the fact that we are doing
a second experiment which was a terrain alerting experiment with a separate dedicated terrain
alerting display. As you are aware there is a display space availability problem in the cockpit.
There is also a second problem, which is if you have a short term critical alert you do not want the
crew to go heads down to evaluate the threat and resolve it. So you go into this trade off of
where do you want the crew looking. We understand the issue. We didn't include TCAS because
of experimental difficulties, not because we do not think it is a problem.
Pat Adamson (Turbulence Prediction Systems) - I encourage everybody to look at the $7 ARP
wind shear document. There is a lot of work going on with that committee on displays with
regard to short look and longer look predictive systems. In fact, there is a draft out of a display
concept. I think that the entire community should be looking at that as well as studies of such
displays. Clearly there are several types of wind shear systems being considered from short look
to longer look. I guess I would encourage you to take a look at that document as part of your
studies.
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Wind Shear Related Research at Princeton University
Dr. Robert Stengel, Princeton University
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Laboratory for Control and A u tom a tion
Real-Time Decision Aiding:
Aircraft Guidance for
Wind Shear Avoidance
D. Alexander Stratton and Robert F. Stengel
Princeton University
Presentation Outline
• The Microburst Hazard to Aviation
• Processes of a Wind Shear Advisory System
• Simulated Microburst Encounters
Princeton University j
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Laboratory fi)r Control and A u toma lion
The Low-Altitude Wind Shear Threat
• Microburst phenomenon
-Short-lived, powerful outflow
-Aircraft performance, control
• Microburst research
- Wet, dry environments classified
- Frequency, characteristics determined
-Guidance and control strategies
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An Advisory System for
Wind Shear Avoidance
GROUND-BASED
SYSTEMS
TDWR
LLWAS
PIREPS
ATIS
Terminal forecasts
Weather data
Visual observations
Future products
Crew Interface
ADVISORY
SYSTEM
LOG IC
V
AIRCRAFT
AND
SYSTEMS
ON-BOARD SENSORS
Reactive sensors
Weather radar
Forward-look sensors
Lightning sensors
Future products
• Support crew decision reliability
Monitoring and estimation, data link
Risk assessment
Provide decision alternatives
Recovery procedures
• Define computational structure
Summarize relevant information
Incorporate meteorological data
Declarative structure, convert to real-time
Princeton University J
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Reducing the Wind Shear Threat
• Flig
FAA Windshear Training Aid
• Ground-based detection systems
LLWAS, TDWR
Weather services, forecasting
• Airborne detection technology
Doppler radar, lidar, infra-red
Radar reflectivity, lightning
• Integration, information transfer j
Princeton University
Laboratory [or Control and Automation
Energy-Based Hazard Model
One-dimensional energy model:
dEs..
_(t) = Ps- y(t)V a
• F-"F-factor" (Bowles)
(l)dwx . Wh(t)
tts)
Specific excess power (P) variation
S
Airspeed variation
NASA Langley- 0.1 average Fover 1 km
• Energy deviation across shear
Van Whave Ax
AEs = - YaveAx = - _ -Awx + Va----n
Princeton University J
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Forward-Look Sensor Measurement
of Wind Shear
! I
! !
|
| | e iIe e
Relative Speed
of the
Air Masses
m
Remote Wind Speed
with respect to --
Aircraft
Aircraft Speed
with respect to
Local Air Mass
AWjk = Zjk- Va
• Aircraft Specific Energy Loss
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AEs = - 5-avekX = -_
Vail
AWx +
Whave
Van
Ax
Princeton University J
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Stochastic Prediction Algorithm
DISTANCE _ _,
t_l \ Range Gate "j"
TIME _!_ _
• Coupled Kalman filters
"Random walk" stochastic model
Sensor platform motion - state propagation
Parallel processing
Optimize design gain parameter
° Coupled predictive-reactive detection
• Positive detection- threshold exceedence
Princeton University J
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Probability-Based Decision Strategy
........ r
• Predictive measurements zp(t)
• Probability-based decision-making
Pr{3ti e [t,tf]: w(ti) e UI zp(t),ud(t) = Udl} < T _ ud(t) = Udl
• Bayesian inference
Pr{zp(t) IH} Pr{H}
Pr{HIzp(t)} - Pr{zp(t)}
• Joint probability computation j
_'_ , , - Princeton University
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Computational Processes for
Decision Aiding
• Identify Knowledge, Structure
Inference Engine
Multivariable Bayesian Rule-Basedl
Estimation Processing Processing
li 41 4i _ i
' _....__......_
,, m
i _'.}
(Alg( thin Base_ll "- Data Base " (Rule Base")
_40 e: timato,'s)), (_321 Parameters)_ _.234 R,, es)J
Knowledge Base
/ "'-2" ^'3I
• Rule-Based Logic
Declarative, back-chaining inference
Top-level monitoring, assessment, planning,
guidance functions
• Bayesian Logic
Statistical model, data-driven inference
• Multivariable Estimation
Stochastic model
Princeton University J
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f Bayesian Network Risk ssessment
Lighlning
Pr{Present} = 0.036
Pr{ Absent} = 0.964
Lightning-Detec!ion
Pr{Present} = 0.229
Pr{ Absent } = 0.771
Geographical Location
Pr{ Arid Region } = 1.0
l"ime-of.Dav ] Pr{ Non-Arid ] = 0.0
Pr{Morning'}=0.0 [ -
Pr{Afternoon } = 1 0 " [Pr{Evening} - 0 0" [ [Surface Humidity I-- _'_"' " I Pr{Dry} = 1.0
_S[N°I Dry} =0"0
Convective Weather
PrlWet Conv.}= 0.028
Pr{Dry Cony. } = 0.139
Pr{Not Cony. } = 0.833
I1_ ..... • • r'r{H_.vyl=0.0095
[Pr{ Absent } = 0.87 s,vino _near Pr{ R.Show. } = 0.049
Pr{ Severe} = 0.0013 Pr[Virga} = 0.29Pr{ Not Sev. } = 0.999 Pr{None } = 0.65
Turlmlence Delection
Pr{Warningl = 0.14
Pr{ No Warning} = 0.86
TDWR
Pr{MB Advts.] =0.0t 12
Pr{WS Advts.} = 0.0201
Pr{ None) = 0.9687
Reactive
Pr{Alert} = 0.0014
Pr{Caution ] = 0.0010
0.9976
Weather Radar
Pr{ Heavy } = 0.0284
PriMod.} = 0.0751
Pr{None} = 0.8964
Forward.Look
Pr{ Warning } = 0.0029
Pr{ Caution } = 0.0282
Pr{ None} = 0.9689
11
PIREP
Pr{ Severe} = 0.0011
Pr{Moder. } = 0.0101
Pr{None} = 0.9888
IjLPr{MB Advis. } = 0.0279Pr[WS Advis.} = 0.5534
Pr{ None } -- 0.4187
• Assign link probabilities, priors
° Probabilities updates, Bayes's theorem
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Spatial and Temporal Factors
• Likelihoods weigh timeliness, nearness
- Dual-doppler data (Hjelmfelt, 1988)
._ ' I _I ' I 'I' I ' J I . I ! l ! ! ! i
0.8
0.6
_ 0.4
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 2(1 22 24 26 28 30
Duration time, rain
• Network time-dependant, re-initialize
• Repeated evidence, downgrade relevance
Princeton University J
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0.1
0.01
0.001
0.0001
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Risk Assessment Benchmarks
High
Risk
Risk
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Weather Evaluation Exercise
• Windshear Training Aid Guidelines
- 12 Weather Evaluation Exercises
- Risk Assessed by WTA authors
Example: moderate convection
results in Medium risk
Low
Risk
l_
• Bayesian Network Calculations
- Monotonic relationship
- Subjective levels assigned /
, Princeton University
Laboratory for Control and Automation
Robustness of Predictive
Wind Shear Detection
• Robustness issues
Variation in microburst structure
Vertical winds unmeasured
Bandwidth limitations
• Detection robustness metrics
Probability of Correct Warning, Pr{A I WS}
False Warning Probability, Pr{A I-_ WS}
Pr{A I WS}
Pr{WS I A} = Pr{A }
Pr{A} = Pr{A I WS}Pr{WS} + Pr{A I
Pr{WS}
WS}[I - Pr{WS }]
• Accuracy metrics
Mean-Square Prediction Error
Mean Advance Warning Time
Princeton University J
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Prediction Algorithm Refinement
• Probability of Correct, Missed Detection
Monte Carlo analysis
• Design parameter optimization
Mean-Square Hazard Prediction Error
• False Warning Probability
0.001
0.0001
0.00001
0
"--'-- "__
.........................ii!ilill¸II ii iMil
.... ,J........... N
0.025 0.05 0.075 0.1 0.125 0.15
Design Threshold of Algorithm
• Benchmark Statistics for Bayesian Network
Princeton University
Laboratory for Control and Automation
Selection of Design Threshold
• Fixed design threshold
Tolerance for false warning rate
Tolerance for wind shear encounter
Pr{WS I A } [1 - Pr{WS}]
)v=[1 -Pr{WS I A}] Pr{WS}
10,000
"_£ 1000
 ,oo
:.2
._ 10
.... I .... I .... I ' ' ' ' IL
......................... : .......................... _ ............................ , ...... ; .............
0 "" "0.0"25 0.05 0.075 0.]
Design Threshold of Algorithm
• Variable or multiple threshold
Princeton University j
im!
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Benefit of Integrated Warning
1
0.1
o.oo
0.0003
1 10 100 1,000 10,000
Likelihood Ratio
• CASE 1
Prior Pr{H} = 1/20,000
Likelihood ratio = 200 (0.075 radial F)
Posterior = 1/100
• CASE 2
Prior Pr{HIE} = 1/1000
Likelihood ratio = 8 (0.05 radial F)
Posterior = 1/100
Princeton University j
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Wind Shear Safety Advisor
Determines "High" Risk
Prlncscom Wind Shs_r SBfecy Advisor
£1slr Define Sclnar(o Presets Reset Parameters Run System Tutorial
Ouklance tnro_mallon and User Inleracllon Wlr,dow Rule MordtorlnO Window
o$oo$oo$$o08101*$1eoso$ossmi$ sm$1msmml solo Ss $
WINDSHEAR ADVISORY ALERT
Illlllllllllllllllllllllllllllll_lll Itll III I I
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Conclusions
• Diverse information aids hazard avoidance
• Explicit models easier to refine, validate
- explicit conditions
- statistical data, analysis
• Architecture for strategic decision-making
- Mission planning, vehicle guidance
- Failure detection, reconfiguration
• WSSA logic applications
- Pilot training aid
- Automated detection, recovery guidance
Princeton University J
Laboratory for Control and Automation
Reducing the Threat:
Manual Recovery Strategies
• After liftoff/on approach technique
- Aggressive application of thrust
- Pitch toward 15 ° attitude
-"Respect Stick Shaker"
- Higher attitude , thrust if necessary
• On the runway
- Aggressive application of thrust
- Below V1, abort takeoff
- Above Vr, rotate toward 15 °
- With less than 2000 if.runway, rotate
toward 15 ° (possible tail scrape)
• Pilot Report
Princeton University J
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Wind Shear Related Research at Princeton University
Questions and Answers
Unknown - I would like to comment that Rob's work is independent of the accident investigation
on the Colorado Springs accident which is still far from complete. We appreciate the efforts that
they are doing, but you should not leave here with any conclusions based on it.
Rob Stengel (Princeton University) - No certainly and we have not made any conclusions
either.
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Systems Issues in Airborne Doppler Radar/LIDAR Certification
Questions and Answers
Bruce Mathews (Westinghouse) - I would like to state that Westinghouse wishes to distinguish
that its antenna beam is in no way pointed in an arbitrary fashion. The hazard factor that we
produce and are detecting is for the expected trajectory of the aircraft. We expect that to be
accurate, to some degree, no matter what altitude. I think you have raised many valid points. I
especially like the point that you made about the limitations of simulation for certifying an
airborne radar. Many of the points that you have made about radar cross sections, and the
detection of other small targets in the presence of those kinds of radar cross sections are very
valid. Thirdly, I would like to say, there axe other forms besides this wind shear review meeting
where these kinds of systems development issues have been raised including the AIRINC Tag
meetings and the RTCA. To some extent I think what NASA has been doing is trying to shape or
form a skeleton that we can move along, in sort of a road map fashion, toward certification. In
summary though, I think you have made some very good points about certification of airborne
radar.
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FAA Regulatory/System Standards/Certification Status
Questions and Answers
Dave Gollings (FAA) - I would like to put in a little pitch for the pilots. I think we are in pretty
good shape in terms of defining the threat. We are in pretty good shape as far as modeling and
what kind of simulation needs to be done to certify. We are way behind the eight ball in terms of
defining and standardizing the symbology for the display. I don't think the FAA wants to be in the
position of legislating that. We are looking to industry to tell us what kind of symbology they
would like, and will work with you on standardizing'it.
Frank Rock (FAA) - That is a very important point that was just made. Standardization of
displays and symbology, we have that problem almost every time we get a new product coming
on board the airplane. We have gone through it with TCAS and we are looking at it again here
for predictive wind shear.
Randy Avera (FAA) - I would like to encourage everybody to feel free to give us calls at the
FAA when you submit for a supplemental type certificate. A lot of people are intimidated and I
would like to remind you that we are not the IRS. We are people who's job is to help you get
your project approved, and like has been said here the fewer requirements the better. Some of
our applicants will send in a STC application and that is the last you will ever here from them until
they call up one day and say "hey where is my STC" and we say "where is your data."
Submission of the application, the data, and trips to the ACO's to discuss it face to face has a lot
of credit. People working together .solve a lot of problems and you understand things clearer.
We would like to encourage you at your separate ACO's that you are dealing with, to maintain a
good continuous working relationship there. That is going to cut down on the time that it
ultimately takes to get the product in the aircraft and approved.
Frank Rock (FAA) - That reminds me of the guy that came to the ACO and said, "I want my
aircraft certified." And the guy says "where is your data package." He says, "I don't need one I
have the airplane outside." And the guy says "well you have got to have the data so that we know
that it complies with all the regulations." And he said "I don't see why you need to do that, come
on out I will take you for a ride and show you that it does all those nice things."
Q: Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - Is it possible to start a certification procedure without the
RTCA having completed its business?
A: Frank Rock (FAA) - Tony Broderick reminds us constantly that an applicant has a right to
certify his equipment with whatever data he presents. It does not have to be from any recognized
group or organization. The RTCA is a committee that has been recognized by us and other
agencies as an advisory group, and is made up of all the interested parties in the aviation
community. We rake their input as being one that at least identifies what needs to be done to
equipment onboard the airplane. That is the whole purpose for these men to get together and
donate their time, and the manufacturers pay their salaries. We could walk off and do as we
please, that could happen. At times I have done it, where I disagreed with the SAE or the_RTCA
committee. I don't like to do that and I don't think that any of the other FAA types like to do it if
at all possible.
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Q: Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - But any manufitcturer could bring his own technology,
his own methodology and means and that could be accepted?
A: Frank Rock (FAA) - He has a right to do that yes.
Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - I guess my message is that perhaps somebody ought to be
thinking about RTCA's for some of these other technologies. Right now the only one that has
made any real headway, and we are supporting it, is the radar.
Frank Rock (FAA) - The procedure to generate an RTCA committee is that any interested party
could submit a request to what used to be the old executive committee, to consider a technology
to be looked at or form a committee to examine and develop the standards for it. That can be
done by most industry people. The FAA can do it as well.
Q: Jim Evans (MIT) - It was stated that the threat environment specification is largely complete
and in good shape. How has the threat specification for the wind shear phenomena and the clutter
environment been established and where can one obtain a copy of the specification?
A: Kirk Baker (FAA) - The FAA right now is developing a systems requirements document,
and part of that document includes wind modeling that we are working with NASA to develop.
Those models right now are largely being developed for the wind shear phenomenon itself. One
of those includes a gust front, but largely is focused on microburst. Part of what we have seen
these last two days obviously is going to effect probably some of the ways that we start to look at
those. For example, the flight paths that we have the applicant demonstrate through these
different events. The clutter environment is something that we are probably going to look to
NASA to help us develop. The vendors themselves have been doing quite a lot of work in clutter
mapping and we would expect that they would provide those maps and environments to us and
those would be overlaid in the simulations. There is probably going to be some flight testing
involved also. I think Roland stated earlier that it is going to be a combined mixture of different
types of demonstrations. I encourage the applicants to step forward and make an effort to start
putting together their ideas in how they plan to demonstrate the intended functions of their
systems. We in the FAA can't provide you with a cookbook answer right now and we do not
intend to. We are going to give you some minimum requirements that we think are applicable,
and you are going to have to demonstrate those minimum requirements. We are in the process of
developing those. This is an on going thing so to say we are in good shape, I think we are. I
think we have got some things down in writing and we are continually working to improve those
and it will continue through the summer I am sure.
Q: Unknown - Will the FAA be willing to certify a non-universal wind shear detector to meet
the rule mandate? Should this question be answered prior to the vendors producing their
technology?
Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - As you know, in the airborne side there has been a lot of
focus on the convective microburst kinds of environments as hazardous. In fact you can even see
in the algorithms, features that depend on some sort of stagnation flow with outflows and
estimates of certain mechanical properties in the wind field to help support the alerting structure.
The question is, from the certification point of view, are you willing to certify microburst
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detectorsor are you going to certify wind shear detectors for whatever the atmospheric
phenomenon is that gives rise to some level of agreed upon energy change that could be
hazardous to the airplane? That is kind of the question.
A: Kirk Baker (FAA) - We are going to do wind shear detection that gives rise to hazardous
energy changes to airplanes.
Q: Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - How does the industry feel about that? Whose ox does
that gore? Nobodies oxen got gored, so it must be all right. I think that has significant
ramifications with regard to certification.
Jim Evans (MIT) - It seems to me that when you start talking about whether you build physical
understanding about the phenomenon that may cause it versus not, you may adopt a slightly
different principle. That is, if you have an event that possibly looks marginal, if we can decide
what marginal is, that you insist that it have more meteorological characteristics, to rule out the
marginal cases. Let me give an example of that. This came up with the LLWAS system. There
were a lot of problems with the enhanced LLWAS system creating false alerts in gusty Chinook
winds. The problem was, there might be a shear but it was very momentary. In fact, it would not
even be there seven seconds later. There was something there, but it wasn't clear it deserved to
be called a microburst in the sense that it was a very transient phenomenon. The same issue arises
here. You go out and you make a measurement fifteen seconds or thirty seconds in advance and
if the thing goes away under some kind of very transient environmental condition then there is a
question about creating nuisance alerts. So, when you look at something and it looks like a
serious shear, it is a high level shear and it even seems to have some persistence, then maybe I
don't demand that it meet a convective storms criteria. If I have something that just popped up
and it looks kind of marginal, maybe I insist that it at least look like something that is going to
stick around for a while.
Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - A good example of that is a report floating around the
country concerning the Cafe Pacific 747-400 that got two wind shear alerts going into Singapore.
About 300 miles off shore there was a tropical depression. Reasonable people can look at that
data and question, was that just abnormal structure and turbulent flows being produced by that off
shore depression, or was that a hazardous wind environment? I suspect you could give to five
different competent analyst and get maybe two and a half different answers. The point is that
there are many things in the atmosphere that can give rise to energy change, but the ones that we
clearly must protect from are the microburst convective downdraft kinds of things. I think the
answer that we heard from Kirk was that you must protect against all atmospheric phenomenon
that will give rise to hazardous energy change to the airplane. Whatever it's atmospheric source,
character or origin. I really thought some of you radar guys out there would say something about
this.
Jim Evans (MIT) - I think we are beginning to repeal rationality. One thing I always hate about
meteorologists is they always talk about extreme events, the most dry, the coldest, the wettest or
whatever. If we are going to talk about all possible atmospheric conditions, I don't understand
what the test program is going to be to deal with all the possible combinations of atmospheric
phenomenon we could ever imagine. You will never test against all that. It is bizarre. In fact it
doesn't make practical sense. If you are willing to accept that adequate protection is provided by
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a reactive system that doesn't provide any reactive output on takeoff until you have gotten to at
least 50 feet in altitude, I would argue that there is a fraction of events that are, potentially
hazardous that it is not going to protect you against. And, if you are willing to buy that, why do
you then want to turn around and require protection against everything when you have already
stated it is safe below 50 feet. I think you are repealing rationality. You have to make some
value judgn_nts and stick by them.
Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - Don't accuse me of being a meteorologist. I think this is a
fairly important question. One of these days somebody is going to walk into an ACO office and
say, "Look what I got. This microburst detector is the best thing since sliced bread." and they are
going to say, "So what. What about the other nine or ten test cases that you must protect the
airplane against." It gets at the heart of the certification procedure. Are we going to do it? Are
we going to have the target generator concept that the RTCA is looking at? Are we going to
have gust fronts in there, off shore strong sea breezes, Chinook winds, thunder storms and all
those embedded. I do not think the industry can afford that target generator to plug your radar
into to show a minimum operating performance standard. Are we going to do it in simulation?
Who in the country is building the database which will be qualified to subject the various +_
instrumentation capabilities to, for detection performance, rejection of certain characteristics that
are not considered hazardous, etc. This is where we are=off the airborne side. How do you test
the adequacy of a system? By what means do we do this? Who says that these databases are
qualified for these uses? Or, do you get some good old boys from the industry together and they
write a MOP because they all think they can meet it? I think some of you understand that
problem,
i
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Todd Murr, Northwest Airlines
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Results of In-service Evaluation of Wind Shear Systems
Questions and Answers
Q: Larry Gordan (MITRE) - Could you just take a minute and talk about some of the issues
that predictor systems raise to pilots from your point of view?
A: Todd Murr (Northwest Airlines) - A lot of the concern that Northwest is having deals with
pilot confidence and nuisance rate. If you detect an event thirty seconds ahead, by the time they
penetrate this event there may not be an event or they will be at a lot higher altitude so they won't
be getting the outflow. Also, if you are familiar with Northwest we are doing a lot of the curve
path approaches. If you have a system that constantly looks three nautical miles out in front of
you as you are doing a curve path approach, this might raise some interesting issues that we
haven't 'addressed yet or we don't know how to address.
Q: Jim Evans (MIT) - When you talk about the performance being exceptional. How many
wind shears do you reckon the systems have detected?
A: Todd Murr (Northwest Airlines) - I would say that we haven't seen any wind shears at all.
We do not expect to see any wind shears and hope not to in this evaluation program.
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*Picture of N88777 ..... "
Good Afternoon Ladies and Gentlemen
This was our first bite of the windshear apple! A
Continental Plight from Denver to Houston , August 7, 1975.
Fortunately in this accident there was no loss of life, others
have been far less so.
Following this occurrence, a comprehensive study was_
undertaken by Continental Airlines Flight Operations to establish
procedures to prevent a re-occurrence of this type of accident,
Text and simulator training were developed and employed shortly
thereafter.
FAA mandated windshear training is now required, low level
windshear alerting systems have been installed at some airports,
terminal doppler weather reporting systems have been installed
at two airports with 40 or more coming soon, since this accident.
Reactive windshear systems , the best answer industry had
at the time, have been installed on many aircraft and are now
required on all aircraft being delivered.
N88777 encountered a strong microburst tailwind
component of over 60 knots just at rotation. In our mind. the
present reactive windshear systems, by themselves, will not
prevent this type of accident. TDWR and LLWAS will not be
installed at all airports that are subject to these microburst
phenomena. Therefore, an advanced warning system, predictive, if
you will, is required for the safety of our passengers.
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We have worked over the past two years with Bendix, Collins,
Westinghouse, and Dr. Pete Sinclair of CSU to find a solution
to the windshear problem that is cost effective and provides the
margin of safety required. W_th the able assistance of the PAA
aircraft certification office in Long Beach we have modified
three aircraft in our fleet, 1 737-300 and 2 A-300's, to assist
the vendors in data collection. The 737 was delivered from
Boeing with a Sunstrand Mk V GPWS/WS system: it has been modified
' I
by adding another Sunstrand Mk V, Dr. Sinclair s IR unit, a
modified Collins WXR-700 weather radar system, and an optical
disk recording system. The A-300 aircraft have similar
modifications, one featuring a modified Bendix RDR-4A radar and
the other a Westinghouse HODAR 3000 system. Each aircraft has
the Sunstrand reactive system installed to furnish a base line
for wlndshear correlation. All windshear information is
transparent to the flight deck and normal operating procedures
are unaffected. Because of comprehensive windshear avoidance
procedures developed by the FAA and NASA, and employed by our
airline, no significant shears have been encountered. However,
an enormous amount of data has been collected to aid in ground
clutter reduction and moving target discrimination in the
approach and departure areas.
Recent meetings with the PAA, NASA Langley, and the vendors
make us feel that the windshear solution is at hand. We intend
to proceed under the 5256 exemption and feel certification of a
predictive windshear system will be possible in the mid 1993
time frame,
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We would now like to present some display and alerting
scenarios that the predictive systems will provide.
I) Landing- windshear detected 1.5 miles or more from aircraft.
2) Landing- windshear detect6d 1.5 miles or less from aircraft.
3) Takeoff- windshear detected prior to V1 within 5 miles.
4) Takeoff- windshear detected after Vl within 1.5 miles.
5) Takeoff- windshear detected after V1 1.5 to 5 miles
These efforts have been possible because of a true and
abiding commitment to safety by Bendix, Collins, Sunstrand,
Westinghouse and Dr. Sinclair.
We would like to express our appreciation for the advice,
assistance and encouragement we've received from Dr. Bowle's
group at NASA Langley. When it's dark in the tunnel it's nice to
have someone not only have a candle, but to light it to show
the way.
Thank you for your attendance
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Results of American In-service Evaluations
Questions and Answers
Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - I feel I have to defend your comment about the In Situ
algorithm. As you know there was a formal request that we required for that. It went out to four
manufacturers. You saw the results from Collins, they used it. I don't know to what degree
Westinghouse has used it, but never the less that information was clearly in your vendors hands.
We saw no reasonable attempt to use that algorithm at all. In fact I think it was fairly confusing
for people to use because of the distribution of accelerometers located around the airplane. You
have got some in the tail, some in the nose, but nothing near the CG. I think it have been in your
vendors hands, but there have been no will to work with it.
Greg Gering (American Airlines) - I really was not trying to put blame in any one spot. We
started our flight testing before you did your summer flight tests. Some of the decisions that we
made were made before the things were available. It was just one of those things where we were
trying to meet the time line for a 1995 installation. We ended up going into the flight test before
we had all the data andwe are trying to back in stuff later. I am not saying that you did not
provide it on time or anything else. We were collecting data before we had it and we tried to
back it in later. : :
Q: Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - What has prevented backing it in? Is it that American
has lost interest in the whole program, or is it that your vendor can't work with it?
A: Greg Gering (American Airlines) - We are collecting the data and we have 1,000 cycles
since last October of data that we can use for it.
Q: Russel Targ (Lockheed) - As a technologist I am a little puzzled about what seems to be a
systems evaluation in which nothing happens. We have three airlines very pleased that they have
mounted a brick in the cargo bay. There have been no false alarms, no nuisance alerts, no alerts
of any kind, and they all conclude that it looks good to them. I am puzzled as to how this
amounts to an enthusiastic systems evaiuation of a system that hasn't apparently done anything.
Certainly in the NASA flights where your going through microbursts, you have some successes
and some failures, but above all there is data. That is of course what anybody would want to
evaluate the system. So, I am puzzled as to the criteria that the airlines are applying for these
enthusiastic reports that we have heard?
A: Greg Gering (American Airlines) - I won't saythat we are enthusiastic about how the
system has been totaling working. Our part of the evaluation was not to find a microburst or a
wind shear. The basic part that all three airlines went into flight testing for was to provide the
high number of cycles and high number of hours in normal operation, and look for some of the
base line noise.
Unknown - I was going to add a little bit to that. 1 have flown for twenty years in all types of
environments and in over 12,000 hours I have never flown through a microburst. I think you will
find that most pilots, military or air carder don't. Especially today with the amount of education
we have had in the area. If you see one or you think you are about to encounter the conditions
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whereyou might find an event like that you tend to avoid them. A test program on an air
transport category aircraft is certainly not going to take any precedence over normal procedures.
Sam Shirck (Continental Airlines) - We have collected a tremendous amount of data that we
are not processing ourselves. We do not build systems, we do not build radars, we just use them
and break them and buy more of them. They keep us out of the mud and the trees and things like
that. We ate not to interested in the data. We are interested in what is going to be developed.
My gut reaction as a pilot to what I am hearing from Bendix, Collins and Westinghouse is that
they are damn close, and we are really happy with that. We think by the middle of next year we
will possibly have a certified system, at least by the end of 1993. I sit in the back of the airplane
once in a while and I am happy that we have got something that is going to keep it from
wallowing around like triple seven did, where you don't have a chance on take off. That accident
happened on an 82 degree day on a balanced field. The airplane definitely loves the ground at
Denver. There is not enough oxygen up there. The type of system we are looking for will prevent
this type of an accident, or of it even coming close to happening. So I think we are very
optimistic, from all three vendors. We are disappointed that the IR is not showing the results that
we had hoped. We are proud of what NASA is doing. We are proud of the support that the FAA
has given us and the opportunity that Tony gave us for the two year extension. So we are elated.
We are a lot better off than we were before.
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GENERAL QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Q: Unknown - When you discuss gust rejection, I understand the physics of ignoring short time
scale things along the flight path in the horizontal dimension. However, during the real crashes,
aren't there some substantial controllability issues. Why is that is never discussed? Is it just
because it is to hard to model and measure, or is it really not an issue?
A: Dave Hinton (NASA Langley) - Well, I am not going to say it is not an issue. Obviously in
the Dallas/Fort Worth crash there were a few significant control problems associated with coming
out the back side of that microburst. However, I do not know of any other cases where that has
been true. That turbulence or upset was not a problem to the airplane until a very significant
amount of energy had been taken out of the aircraft by the wind shear it had just flown through.
By far the predominant effect from a microburst or a wind shear is the performance impact on the
airplane. There are control problems. As a matter of fact there was an incident in Japan
concerning an L-1011 I believe that made a very severe landing and it popped rivets out of the
wings because of turbulence close to the ground. Terrain induced turbulence; that is a problem.
But it is not the problem we are studying. You can cite Dallas/Fort Worth, but generally that is
not the problem that caused the loss of life in microburst wind shear accidents.
Dan Vicroy (NASA Langley) - Just as a side note, I did a study about three years ago that
looked at the handling the qualities effect rather than the performance effect. What is the effect
on the handling qualities when you fly through a microburst? I looked at pitching and rolling
moments and some of the asymmetrical aerodynamic loading, and so on. There is an effect there,
but again it is a second order effect when Compared to performance degradation that the airplane
seeS.
Q: Jim Evans (MIT) - I have a question I guess for the FAA. What is the FAA's decision
process going to be apropos this rule making for reactive versus forward looking systems. It
would appear from the results that Joe Gibson supplied that there is some concern about
preventing accidents with reactive systems. Now it can be claimed that they have prevented a lot
of accidents, but I will also note that only 15% of the air fleet was equipped, and they are not
having accidents either. So it doesn't follow that reactive systems have prevented accidents. If
we come to a point two or three years down the line and the look ahead system, which certainly
have a desirable factor of being able to do avoidance, aren't yet certified, will the FAA require
people to install the reactive systems or instead Would it take the attitude that the potential
advantages are great enough that people would be able to defer installing the reactive systems to
see the look ahead can be brought to a suitable level of maturity?
A: Frank Rock (FAA) - It is a regulation; you have it, it is on the books; it has been mandated
and you have a compliance date. I believe this one was mandated by Congress as well, which
means you are going to have to get special dispensation to get around that. The regulation in the
situation that we had with the predictive systems was one in which the petitioners petitioned the
administrator for an extension and they were given two years for an extension. Those people who
have not done that will have to comply with the rule. Now when we get to that point of course,
other things may happen. There may be petitions by a large group of people such as the ATA or
someone like that, who petition the rule to be extended. This is all possible, but right now there is
nothing in the works that would indicate that it would go beyond the 1993 date. That is the date
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thattheTCAS aswell as the reactive system requirement ends.
Q: Myron Clark (FAA) - There has been extensive discussion on calculating F-factors. I do not
believe I have heard any discussion of the error ranges in the calculations.
A: Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - We have done those, and here is a simple way to look at
it. For remote sensors, the way we calculate it is basically the scalar groundspeed divided by
acceleration of gravity times a measured estimate of the gradient. That whole term is actually
much more complicated, but at the risk of being run out of here I am not going to show you what
it is. It actually is a rank two tensor taken with a suitable inner product. It depends on all nine
elements of the wind field gradient; three winds shearing in three dimensions. For purposes of this
calculation the simple form is O.K. From this we subtract the vertical wind divided by the
airspeed. One way to look at this is to let there be a nominal value of the things that can have
errors. Groundspeed measurement can have error, that is coming right off of the airplane or an
estimate from the ground radar. The gradient estimate, the partial of horizontal wind with
distance, can have errors. The vertical wind estimate can have error and airspeed can have an
error, because that is a measurement off the airplane state variables. But, the airspeed errors are
very small and trivial so we won't bother it. So, the change in F depends upon taking the
appropriate derivatives of the things that have errors. You evaluate it around a nominal value.
Take the RMS and throw in reasonable errors in groundspeed measurement, gradient
measurement and vertical wind measurements, and you find that the error is on the order of 10%
of the threshold value. In fact, that was one of our instrument requirements that we try to hold
the error to 10% of the threshold value. I did not bring the curve with me, Myron, but the
problem is under control.
Myron Clark (FAA) - A little follow up on that, if I may Roland. I know that test pilots want to
know the F-factor because they are out there flying in it. But, what I am concerned about and I
don't think there is anybody in my organization that is to enthralled with, is the idea of letting
pilots know what the F-factor is and what the aircraft performance is so they can play one against
the other. So, as long as we are not thinking along those lines.
Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - No, this is the variable by which one thresholds to enunciate
through excepted caution warning protocol in the flight deck, a level 3 alert. No, we don't say it
is .09, tell me whether you got that performance at your configuration and weight and if is O.K.
No, absolutely not. No sensible person would propose that.
Q: Gerry Aubrey (United Airlines) - We have heard a lot the past couple of days about
forward looking wind shear on the glide slope. How about on the takeoff?.
A: Brae Bracalente (NASA Langley) - From NASA's standpoint, we are using it during
takeoff. We usually tilt it up at about three degrees on takeoff. I did show one event where we
landed with a small microburst at the departure end of the runway. We were in an auto-tilt mode,
and as we came down the antenna was tilted up. After landing it was at about plus one and a half
degrees and as we taxied down the runway we were still detecting it at the other end. We feel the
radar can be very useful for takeoff and work there as well as it does in the landing case. In fact,
we think the landing case is more difficult than takeoff. So, we feel that if we can solve that, then
we can probably handle the takeoff.
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Bruce Mathews (Westinghouse) - We have collected data on the Continental from weight on
wheels to 2500 feet, landing or takeoff. When we were in Orlando we did see wind shear during
one of our takeoffs and we could show you a tape of that if you are interested. We operate the
mode the same way whether it is landing or takeoff. We point the beam as a function of altitude,
so it does not matter. The prediction is made a little different on takeoff because you are trying to
project where the takeoff path is going to be. That would be the only difference, the expected
path of the aircraft.
Q: Mike Lewis (NASA Langley) - We have heard throughout the conference fairly open
discussion about the IR system and its performance from the other airlines; false alarm rates,
nuisance alert rates and things like that. We have not heard the equivalent sort of information
about the radar performance on Continental. I think from what you said you aren't looking at the
data and that the radar manufacturers are taking it all home, and they say it works great. That is
perhaps not the same sort of treatment we have been giving to the IR box. The question is either
for Continental or the particular radar vendors who are operating on Continental. Can you
provide that same sort of information that we have been heating about the IR box as to the radar
performance on false alarm rate?
A: Steve Grasley (Allied-Signal) - At this point and time the data gathering effort from our
perspective at least at Bendix is fairly new. We are analyzing data I don't think we can
convincingly say to ourselves that it is performing at X level. We don't know that yet. But you
can be assured that we have dialogue with all potential customers about that and we share that
data with them rather closely. I would say that there is probably a chance that we can talk about
those things more in detail at the next conference or in the future.
Q: Mike Lewis (NASA Langley) - From the data that you have looked at so far have you seen
any false or nuisance alarms in the radar results?
A: Steve Grasley (Allied-Signal) - We haven't but we are not processing in that nature yet. We
are still looking primarily at raw data and raw calculations as opposed to calculated F-factor and
how that may be interpreted. We are not to that stage.
Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - There was a well defined basis on which airlines were given
the exemption option. The real question is has there been sufficient data collected to warrant
continuing the exemption process? And if so, where is it? And who has seen it? Fair question,
Frank? I don't think we saw any data this morning from the airlines. I think we saw some good
stuff from the manufacturers, but we didn't see a hell of a lot of data from the airlines. I guess
your point Sam is that you are letting the manufacturers do it for you. Maybe each manufacturer
that is in the exemption process could comment on whether he is meeting his plan as approved by
the FAA to move forward in the exemption process?
Bruce Mathews (Westinghouse) - In response to Mike's question if I can still remember it. We
reached our final configuration about April 3rd. We do not have a lot of data. We have one tape
and we were glad we got it. Continental helped us get it by pulling that tape fast for us. We do
not have a lot of data to show for what I would say is a final configuration. We will be able to
start collecting that though and we will show it to people as we get it. I think our plans are to
move into a different phase of development. We are going to get ready to go fly our BAC 111
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againwith our equipment to gather data on microbursts. It's very difficult to put a qualifying
hazardous microburst minimal detectable features into a qualifying urban airport clutter
environment and I think that is what we want to do in some sense for certification. I do not know
how you can do that with a realistic small number of flights. We have got to get the mountain and
Mohammed and super impose them on each other. This is the way we are going to proceed with
our development. We are flying for false alarm performance now, and we will fly for microburst
but we will have to do these things separately because they don't seem to happen a lot together.
To demonstrate a hundred thousand hour false alarm time is going to take a long time. I heard
people begging me to turn off that false alarm tape that I was running. If you want to look at it
you can look at it. These things are not exciting to look at, and grown men let alone women and
children don't want to look at urban clutter as you are landing in it, it is just not neat stuff to look
at.
Q: Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - Where did you get one hundred thousand hour false
alarm rate? Where did you get that number from?
A: Bruce Mathews (Westinghouse) - Well, ! think that is flight hours, one hundred thousand
flight hours of false alarm data.
Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - It is two hundred and fifty flight hours.
Bruce Mathews (Westinghouse) - Is that what it is? OK, good_
Q: Dan Stack (ALPA) - Regarding in flight detection and prediction of hazards. We have seen
presentations that indicate the real risk can exist not only in the immediate vicinity of a microburst
but at a considerable distance away. It appears that some testing and evaluation is necessary
tangential from the core, prior to the certification process. What plans are in place to insure that
these items are adequately addressed? When this area is thoroughly mixed it will probably lose its
temperature difference from surrounding air mass
A: Dave Hinton (NASA Langley) - From a performance stand point it is part of our plans when
we go into pilot simulations to look into an issue of how close to a microburst icon might you
want to come, or how far should you stay away from one of those given various icon shaping
algorithms. I see John Hansmen has left, but at MIT they have done some parametric studies
looking at the effect of being off center in a microburst and have found the threat drops
considerably at very short distances away from the core and it is a very localized event. With
respect to other phenomenon that may exist some distance from a microburst such as a gust front,
somebody may want to raise the issue. I do not know of anybody looking at gust front detection
as generated by microburst that may be some distance away.
Q: Unknown - There were two things that seemed to me to be coming out as somewhat of a
standard during the discussion the last few days. One of those was the comparison of different
sensors against the In Situ algorithm results. Is there going to be some requirement to make that
comparison somewhere? Is that going to be something that we are going to have to consider?
Also, we talked a lot in the last couple of days about averaging the F-factor calculation across one
kilometer. Is that becoming the standard? You hear a lot of consideration that in some aircraft it
is not right, maybe in some others it is? I don't know if there is a real answer at this point and
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time, but thosetwothingsseemto becomingout itskind of astandard.I amnotsosurethatit is
exactlyright.
A: Kirk Baker (FAA) - If you are flight testing a radar there is a couple of ways you can
validate what you are seeing, and NASA has shown that. One is by TDWR and the other is by an
In Situ F measurement. I don't see us deviating from that method of demonstrating the truth of
your system. I think that is the technique that is around and I think we will be using it. It is
something that we are going to have to negotiate, depending on what you propose to do in your
certification plans to demonstrate that your system performs its intended function. Something
that we have also asked NASA to help us with is defining the threat. The one kilometer averaged
F seems to be something that is coming out as a viable way to probably take care of some of the
wind shears that people keep trying to get us to say you don't have to protect against. One
kilometer seems to weed those out. It is a sustained F over one kilometer. I think that the real
threat to an airplane is a sustained F, so that is a standard that we will probably be starting out
with?
Mike Lewis (NASA Langley) - What we have tried to do and was summarized in the curves that
I showed a couple of days ago, is to postulate a certain set of assumptions and show what an
aircraft can withstand given that set of assumptions. I think it is NASA's feeling that it is the
FAA's job to decide whether those are in fact FAA agreed upon assumptions, or whether they
want to change those. That may or may not have an effect on whether that simple one kilometer
test is adequate. From what we have seen, and I showed in the last curve of my presentation, that
simple test seemed to do a very adequate job of protecting against even the close call incidents by
a wide margin and certainly against the accident cases.
Mary Jo Hoffman (Honeywell) - I have a comment on this F-factor issue. This is my first wind
shear conference. I think I can help you guys see the forest for the trees. I came in here and
everyone was talking about F values of O.15 and it is kind ofan assumed thing now that it is a
standard. It is the same as this one kilometer sustained F-factor issue. Perhaps we should
consider a ranking of the performance of the vehicle as something like a percentage of the thrust
minus the drag over the weight, the energy capability of the aircraft. For example, in a 727 I
might want my red alert to go off at a F ofO. 1 but if I amin a 747r400 1 do not want it to go off
unless it is a 0.2. It is just an issue that I am throwing out for discussion.
Sam Shirk (Continenlal Airlines) - I think you are going to find a lot of comments from the
airlines on that. A lot of the newer two engine aircraft have tremendous performance capabilities.
I know discussions at American, Northwest and we at Continental are hoping that the FAA can
see fit to certify a system where aircraft performance will be factored in, I hate to say that because
I know they are here to help us and it is the other FAA, but there are some good reasons to have
a relaxed F-factor if you will on the airplanes that have great performance. I think it is an issue
that we as airlines I know hope that the FAA does address and hopefully in a manner that we
would like to see it addressed.
Q: Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - Why Sam?
A: Sam Shirk (Continental Airlines) - What we are really talking about here is a true
performance factor. I think operationally the airlines really need this latitude. I can see it
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pluggingoursystemup. Our ATC systemisoverloadedrightnow. ! think thereis goodreason
to beableto departwith a737-300,a767or a757seriesairplane,whena747-400or a727
might sit on thegroundbecauseit doesn'thavetheperformancemargin. I think it is something
thatwehaveto look at, at leastfrom theATC side of the equation. As to whether that same
microburst that we have decided now that we are going to fly through is going to grow, that is a
touchy situation. Maybe it will get smaller too. I am not suggesting that on takeoff if we have
got a microburst inside of a mile and a half we say "Hey this airplane has got a lot of go to it, that
is no problem, I'I1 press on." I am not saying that at all. I am saying for that stuff that is perhaps
outside a three miles, that might be a consideration that we would have. It also might be a
consideration on final whether to abort the landing or to continue. I think it is something that we
have to look at.
Q: Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - When you look at the one kilometer criteria, what you
are saying is that it is O.K. to go ahead and take something on the order of a three knot per
second hit, for something on the order of ten seconds, Or equivalently, almost 2,000 foot per
minute induced sink rate. That is what 0.105 will do for you. Now you may have a lot of
performance left, but I am not so sure you would necessarily want to use it. You would like not
to expose yourself, because it can get worse. Kurt, do you ever envision a situation where you
will make thresholding aircraft specific?
A: Kirk Baker (FAA) - Maybe some of you old dinosaurs can help me that were around when
the TSO was written. I think this subject was heavily debated, varying the threshold for the
performance of the airplane. The situation that you ran into with the reactive system was you
could have a 737 on the runway in front of your 747 t_eoff and fly right through something that
you probably would not want the 747 to fly through. ! think that was one of the reasons that we
felt that we would stick with just one threshold. For predictive systems, where you have the
ability to look ahead, in my opinion you are going to run into the same type of operational
concerns. You are going to have guys going through and some guys going around, and they are
all going to be wondering why did that guy go through it and I did not have an alert, or why did
that guy go around I don't see anything out there. I think it is something we can entertain, but I
am not sure much is going to be gained out of it. These events are not that common and they are
short lived. I would like to see the thresholds stay at the same standard that we have it now for
reactive. If someone can come up with a .scheme that seems to make sense both technically and
operationally I am sure we would consider it for the forward looking system.
Jim Evans (MIT) - I would like to make some comments on what we have learned from TDWR
experience. TDWR and LLWAS have both gone through a mode which for example there are a
distinction between microburst alerts and wind shear alerts with loss. The guidance by the airlines
has been by and large when they get a microburst alert the people should not operate and when
they get wind shear alert with loss they in fact have a pilot decision that takes into account how
loaded the plane is, the density altitude, a bunch of things can be worked in. When we look at our
statistics we see far greater numbers, by factors of four or five, of the wind shear alerts with loss
than microburst alerts. I can certainly say that in places like Orlando, based on some of our
experiences between 1990-1991, it made a big difference whether we were calling some alerts a
microburst alert versus a wind shear alert with loss. I think that at least in Orlando where you get
a lot of minutes a year of alerts it does make a difference. Now you can say it doesn't make a
difference so much to one pilot, but I can tell you that the air traffic down there was getting pretty
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annoyed after a while in 1990 when we were very conservative. I think that right now in the
ground based systems there is some reason for latitude. One of the other elements about some of
the look ahead systems is if I have gone over an F of some number for one kilometer, I would also
ask what about the next kilometer, and the next kilometer beyond that. If I have a thing that
sticks up like a thumb nail and it is one kilometer I may feel differently than if it is a little longer
than that. That is another thing that you would know from the look ahead system, presumably in
some cases at least, it would know how big it is. John Hansmen showed some examples of a pilot
presentation that in a sense had some form of gradation that allowed a pilot to take into
consideration these other factors that get lost when you go to a fixed red-green threshold.
Q: Roland Bowle$ (NASA Langley) - in effect we are doing some of that today. It is my
understanding that in some of the certified reactive systems today we will gain schedule before the
threshold test as a function of altitude. For example, we might be computing the energy loss
parameter, but down gaining it to 80% value before testing threshold. Then, let the gain go
through one, as you go through 750 feet, therefore increasing the sensitivity of the system. So in
effect, depending on what airplane that is on, we may be doing some aircraft specific stuff right
now. I believe there are systems out there that gain schedule with altitude. Kurt, do you know of
any such systems?
A: Kirk Baker (FAA) - Sundstrand does do some gain scheduling. I am not that familiar with
their systems so I don't really feel I can get into the technical side of it. It is usually not the
varying of the threshold, it is the timing of the gain itself.
Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - I do not know how many airplanes we have out there, but a
reasonably significant number were equipped prior to the TSO locking up 0.105 as the threshold..
So, I know we have some planes out there that the thresholds are set at 0.12 right now. There is
a 20% variation right there between some early variance and what the threshold calls for right
now.
Dave Hinton (NASA Langley) - I gue_ I also would like to add one thing to that. Think about
what we are trying to do with these systems. We are trying to prevent the airplane from being
exposed to a hazardous situation, perhaps very close to the ground. If you park one of these
microbursts at the middle marker and you throw 767 with a lot of performance into that, but you
throw in a little pilot recognition delay, you may be digging up approach lights before you get all
that thrust turned around and going the other direction. It is possible. Also, we have an existing
training package out in the fleet that has played a major role in preventing any accidents since
1985. It gives the pilot certain guidelines as to when the atmosphere is doing something very
unnatural and you shouldn't be there and you should go around. Now if we start talking about
bumping thresholds up to perhaps 0.15 when you are back at the outer marker, and there is a 0.13
microburst sitting inside, you are going to deny that pilot an alert yet expose the airplane to a
situation where the wind shear training is going to kick in, and the crew is going to say I shouldn't
be here. So you are going to go around anyway, but you have exposed the airplane to the threat
at low altitude. That is something that has to be considered I think if you want to start bumping
up thresholds as a function of airplane performance.
Mike Lewis (NASA Langley) - I would agree, and the same case holds on rotation. You can
postulate the special case of the microburst right at rotation for which all the extra power in the
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world isn't doing you much good. At that point all the air planes are essentially equal as far as
there margins and so forth.
Terry Zweifel (Honeywell) - If you vary these things with altitude, in essence what you are doing
is sucking the guy in to go lower. The lower he goes the worse it gets, and you just delay and
lose valuable time. Those who have been in simulators with reactive systems and flown out of a
wind shear know that one, two or three seconds can make a big difference on whether you
survive the accident. That is why I personally do not like the idea of scheduling. In our system
we don't actually use 0.105. We use an energy loss threshold which is kind of the equivalent of
what Roland has been talking about. 0.105 is really an energy rate of the airplane. So if you take
it over 1,000 meters, in essence you are integrating that rate. Whenever you establish the distance
you are saying that is how much energy I will let the airplane lose before I turn on the light. We
do the same thing except it is a time based type of thing.
Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - It seems to me that any kind of tinkering with that kind of
mechanics inside the boxes is no substitute for good design. A lot of the reasons for raising
thresholds is to get rid of other undesirable features. There may be better ways to design those
features out, and maintain the integrity of the protection system.
Terry Zweifel (Honeywell) - Obviously if you could do it somehow you would like to set the
threshold much lower than that. The reason for raising it is to get some gust rejection out of it.
There is always a compromise over where that level is going to be. I think that is going to be true
of some of these predictive systems as well as the reactive systems. I think the 0.105 establishes a
base line for commercial airplanes and is probably valid for the whole fleet that we see out there
now. I think Roland has probably looked into that and in fact In'oven that to himself.
Frank ?:,xk (FAA) - I wasn't getting up to say anything, I was getting up to leave, but let me
just throw a little bit into there. After forty years of working in this business, I haven's seen a
system that hasn't been improved for some reason or other over a period of time. I have never
seen a system go out on the market and stay static. It always improves, so we can always expect
that there is somebody coming behind us that is smarter than we are and do it better.
Q: Terry Zweifel (Honeywell) - I do not want this to appear as a biased comment coming from
someone who works on reactive shears, but over the past three days we saw the Doppler radar,
the infrared and the LIDAR results, and while I can't say that it is true, it looks like there is a
possibility there may be shears that they won't detect It was stated that maybe the Doppler radar
would have to go down to minus 15 dBZ. I am not a r',tdar guy, ! don't even know if that is
feasible, but it doesn't sound real good. My question is, ,,,,ould the FAA certify a system for
which there were known cases where it would not detect a _ear?
A: Kirk Baker (FAA) - One of the things that you have heard talked about, is what is the real
intent behind a system like a wind shear detection system? Is it to detect a wind shear, or to
prevent an accident as a result of a wind shear? That question has come up, it is not the f'trst time
we have been asked, and it is going to keep coming up. It is part of establishing a probability of a
missed event. In our requirements document we have something called a missed event and that is
what you just described. How are we going to decide what is an acceptable rating? I am not sure
yet. TDWR has a 90% probability miss, and we have heard discussions on what that really
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means. When you put something on an airplane and it is classified as an essential system, it has to
have a probability of missing of 10-5. Now there is also a lot of conjecture about whether a radar
system can meet a requirement like that Somewhere along the line we are going to have to sit
down and grind through some safety tradeoffs. If we can only detect 98% with a forward looking
system, we have to make sure that for the 2% that we miss we can justify why we accepted that.
I have a feeling it is going to be based on some great improvement on safety. That is the only way
I can see it. From what i have seen fight now I don't think the radars can meet 10 "5, maybe they
can. That is going to come out in the certification work that we do. We are going to see what
the extremes are, and we are going to test the extremes. The models that we create are going to
be in high clutter, embedded rain, dry microburst on the other side scenarios. We are going to
have to test the bounds to see if we can come up with what is the probability of a missed event for
a system like this. I think it is kind of early to say that we won't certify a system that can't detect
that 2%. We are going to have to look at it. We want to be careful not to stifle some real
promising technology.
Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - This is one that 1 really get sort of excited about because if I
look at the TSO there is no such specification in there for reactive manufacturers. They state a
probability of nuisance alert. All these alerts are carefully defined as per the SAE document, very
carefully defined. I think that is one of rigorous things that has come up on the airborne side.
When we talk about alerts for ground base systems is not a rigorously defined alert. Some people
would argue that is advisory information. I don't think there is a missed alert specification in the
TSO. What you do is you take 7 or 8 or 10 accident reconstructions and show that you could
have detected those. Now we are coming in with other industries and we are going to generate a
new number and hold them accountable for some ten to the minus whatever. I don't see that it is
necessary. The point is that you can be so rigorous here that you lock out some growth in
marketplace and competitive issues involving this nation's avionics and civil transport. You could
do that real easy.
Q: Terry Zweifel (Honeywell) - Does that mean that the LIDAR would have its own value and
the Doppler radar would have a different percentage that you allow it to miss and the infrared
another, or how would you do that?
A: Roland Bowles (NASA Langley)- No, I would hope not. I would hope that a careful
analysis from an aviation safety perspective would be done. Someday there will be a hole in the
ground resulting from an airplane crash involving a reactive box. If we could have prevented that
with a forward look system that had a detection probability of 0.7 it may have been worth it. We
don't want to rule out the technology based on an arbitrary set of numbers unless it is based on
really careful analysis. I think the issue on the analog airplane is a good one, I was in the room
when that one was set up and I know where it came from?
Terry Zweifei (Honeywell) - Well, obviously one of the things you could do is something like
TPS did. You can incorporate a backup In Situ algorithm, that is a possibility. That makes the
system cost more because now it has to have accelerometers and air data inputs that perhaps
weren't needed in the first place. I was just curious to know what the thinking of the FAA was on
all of this. ,
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Jim Evans (MIT) - You really haven't responded in a fair way to the challenge that was put forth
by Joe Gibson. What we are trying to do is to prevent accidents. Now we have already heard
about the Continental Flight, there was also an Air Cubana flight which crashed in Havana, and
there was a takeoff accident. You wouldn't even argue that they would have been prevented by
and In Situ system. It seems to me that if we are going to run around arguing about accidents and
which accidents would or would not have been prevented, you would lump those two incidents in
and you would be down to an 80% system. The challenge that was put forth by Gibson was, as
you go to more and more severe sheared events you come to events for which a reactive system
does not react fast enough, and what is the probability of that? I don't know how you could
prove that it was 10 -5 of all microburst events. I don't think you could hold that for one minute.
It seems to me that what you are talking about is the probability of preventing accidents. I think
Jog Gibson put forth a structured approach for dealing with the analysis. I have never seen the
details of the simulations that proved on all the accidents which occurred that you surely could
have prevented them and I don't think we would know that. The reason we don't know that is all
we know is what the winds were like on the path that the plane flew. We have no way of
knowing what the winds were had the plane been responding and tried to fly a slightly different
path. I think there is a lot of elements to it that we just don't know. I would argue that you want
to go back and start worrying about probabilities of preventing accidents and we will start talking
about where the accidents would occur and why they might occur.
• 7
Terry Zweifel (Honeywell) - But then you run into the same problem. How can you prove the
infrared would have prevented an accident? That is the difficulty that you can get into when you
try that tack. How do you prove any of them would have prevented it?
Jim Evans (MIT) - My only point would be that if you are willing to acknowledge that the
reactive systems don't really provide effective protection from a microburst on the runway when
you are about to takeoff. It seems that we can argue from there.
Terry Zweifel (Honeywell) - Actually what you are saying isn't quite true, some of the systems
do detect wind shears on takeoff.
Q: Sam Shirk (Continental Airlines) - Do they detect them effectively?
A: Terry Zweifel (Honeywell) - Well, define effectively?
Q: Sam Shirk (Continental Airlines) - Do they work?
A: Terry Zweifel (Honeywell) - Yes, they are certified to do it. I hope that the FAA would not
certify a system that flat out did not work. I mean I think we can give them a lot more credit than
that. We have run it on simulations of the accidents, including the one you had the picture of, and
it did detect it.
Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - I don't how many valid alerts we have got out there right
now in the reactive system. But I know one thing, NASA 515 got more real confirmed
microburst penetrations than you have probably got in the civil fleet right now. We know how
our reactive box works. I have not seen any evidence of how the boxes that are already out there
work.
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Q: Terry Zweifel (Honeywell) -Itsounds likeyou thinkIam pushing a cause here. Iwasn't
tryingtosay takeyour radarsand go home, the reactivehas solved theproblem. That isnot what
Iam tryingtodo. Iam tryingto say,suppose you gettothe pointwhere thesetechnologies
simply can notdo it,you simply can notdesign,forexample, a Doppler radarthatcan go down to
minus 15 dBZ and detecta shear.What do you do then? You say wellletsstopand go look at
some othertechnology or how do you definewhere thisis?
A: Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - Well, I think there is very adequate precedence in the air
worthiness flight standard side of FAA. We know there is a gust load that will not keep a wing
on an airplane and we design to some maximum gust load, but there is one out there that is going
to tear it apart.
Q: Terry Zweifel (Honeywell) - But the probability there is a lot higher than 10 -5. Either that
or I am going to take the bus back to Phoenix. Obviously airplanes are not totally bullet proof. I
was just bringing up the point of what do you do. I would hate to see everybody go down these
different technology roads and it very well could be that no one of these technologies can detect
all of these shears - dry microbursts, wet microburst all of that stuff. Then where are you and
how do you define what is acceptable?
A: Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - It is going to be settled in policy I think, with some
degree of analysis to support that. As Jim pointed out there is no doubt some out there that will
bite anybody regardless of how good your reactive system is. If you could save one accident per
ten years would that be justifiable for forward look, even though its detection probability may be
0.8?
Terry Zweitel (Honeywell) - But then we can take that to the extreme. Lets assume it can only
detect 0.05 and it saves one airplane. Where is the line?
Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - I think the engineering integrity has to be good enough to
prevent something like that getting through.
Terry Zweifel (Honeywell) - That is the point, the whole area seems to be fuzzy to me. I was
just wondering how the FAA and the industry were addressing that or if any real thought had
been given to it. You have got some pretty gung-ho programs going here and 1995 isn't that far
away. It seems like some of the_ things have got to be settled fairly soon.
Kirk Baker (FAA) - I don't think we can answer that question right now. I haven't seen the
vendors step up and say this is as good as my system can do. I don't know how the FAA can
make a judgment until we know exactly what you can do. Right now the position that I have
taken is to go to the regulations, it says in AC1309 an essential system to performance intended
function must meet 10 -5. That is where I am at right now. I have not seen any of the vendors
step up and say, well, I can only see a 2 dBZ dry microburst in a certain clutter environment. We
are going to take the hard line.
Q: Unknown - You made the statement earlier on that the criteria was one of preventing
accidents and things bumping into the ground. That is not necessarily the same as detecting a dry
mieroburst because there are category dry microburst that may not be detected, but they also may
not be hazardous? We as manufacturers and designers do have a set of design criteria. We
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depend upon Roland Bowles and his team to define a target. I think it is Byron and Lee that
provided statistics on probabilities of various microbursts occurring. We look at designing air
system to detect those. What is missing from those statistics is how many of those remaining are
hazardous. We do need that information from the scientific community if we are going to answer
the 10-5 question. Depending upon how you chose to definethat. Is it the detection of the
microburst that is important or is it prevention of the accident that is important?
A: Kirk Baker (FAA) - That is the obvious question. That is why I stated earlier that I think we
need to sit down and come up with a logical and scientifically validated, as well as it can be,
description of what "intended function" reallymeans. That is what you are trying to describe. Is
it to detect any microburst or wind shear phenomenon or is it to prevent accidents? We are going
to have to sit down and develop that, and I am not going to give you the answer right now
because I do not know what it is.
Roland Bowles (NASA Langley) - I would like to challenge the other side of the industry, Joe
and Boeing and all of you guys, lets build a reactive system for 10 -5 that we can slip into some of
this technology, and all march forward. Lets hybridize! That gets a lot of people off the hook
doesn't it.
Kirk Baker (FAA) - Sure does and it makes my job easier.
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